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Abstract 
The aim of this thesis is to analyze how the annexation of Crimea by the Russian 
Federation is narrated in the leading political discourse and media discourse. This is done 
by     examining two main cases that represent the discourses, a political speech of president 
Putin and a documentary film by Andrey Kondrashov, through the encoding/decoding 
model of Stuart Hall. The thesis first identifies the relevant theoretical stances that explain 
how using the approach of cultural studies helps to analyze images, texts and emotions in 
politics. The thesis then offers an overview of the Russian case, highlighting the main 
motives behind the annexation of Crimea and meaning of Crimea for the Russian identity. 
This is later followed by the analysis of the speech and the documentary. Since the 
approach of Stuart Hall only identifies the types of encodings and decodings, this thesis 
seeks to add an additional analysis to the encoded and decoded messages, by identifying 
narratives and emotions used by the leading political and media discourse. 
The thesis found that a certain set of narratives and emotions were used by both discourses 
in explaining the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation. These narratives were 
quite similar to one another, almost constituting an overlap of the discourses. In order to 
strengthen the messages, both the speech and the documentary were encoded with strong 
moral emotions that in turn caused emotional responses at the stage of decoding. The 
reaction of the audience, hence the decoding stage, was observed via comments in social 
media, news articles and the blogosphere. The results showed that most of the audience 
interpreted the messages in a dominant-hegemonic key, thus agreeing with the essence of 
the proposed messages. The encoded narratives were clearly embraced and empowered by 
the public. Those narratives containing strong moral emotions got mirrored more often by 
the audience, thus stressing the power of emotions in delivering messages. 
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1. Introduction 
Those who watch the news every day must know that image matters. Visualized 
representations significantly influence how we see the world around us and how do we 
interpret it. The same applies for politics. What we see and hear about it directly affect the 
way we understand political phenomena around us. Because of the daily news, politics and 
media seem to be so intertwined and inseparable that we often forget that once it was not 
like that at all. Using visual content in politics has become such a prominent trend that 
political science alone might not be able to fully explain how images, texts and meanings 
work in the political realm.  
Therefore, other approaches help in this analysis, such as sociology, anthropology, 
psychology, and cultural studies, offering an alternative way of explaining the use of visual 
media in politics. Cultural studies, for that matter, focuses on the interdisciplinary power of 
cultural phenomena, a focus that encompasses that almost everything in our lives. 
Therefore, narrowing down to specific approach is a must. Among different approaches in 
cultural studies, British Cultural Studies (BCS) is considered to be the most eminent, often 
focusing on analyzing political developments in the context of visual representations. 
British Cultural Studies helps to understand how politics functions in its spectacularized 
form, actively using visual aids to channel political messages. Especially successful in this 
matter was a leading scholar of the BCS, Stuart Hall. 
In his work, Hall focuses on the encoding of the messages by leading discourses and later 
decoding of these messages by the audience. Although this approach has almost exclusively 
been applied in media studies, this thesis embraces it as a key method to studying the use of 
images and texts in politics, opening a door to the multiple faucets of the modern political 
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realm. The following thesis seeks to explain how political messages are encoded, presented 
and then decoded by the audiences.  
Specifically, the case of narration of Russian annexation of Crimea will be observed. The 
choice of the case is not coincidental, since the use of the visual has been extremely evident 
in Russian politics, especially in explaining the political moves of the country. Considering 
the specificity of Hall’s approach and in order for the analysis to be as precise as possible, 
the observed discourses will be divided into a leading political discourse (represented by 
the political speech) and leading media discourse (represented by the documentary film). 
The two discourses are going to be observed via Halls’s encoding/decoding model, thus 
meaning two stages of creating messages and then interpretation of them by the audiences. 
Interpretation of the messages is going to be observed via comments of the Russian public 
in social media, news articles and the blogosphere. In order to strengthen the explanatory 
power of Hall’s approach, not only the main narratives used by the discourses are going to 
be introduced, but also a power of emotions to channel political messages will be 
highlighted. 
The thesis is structured as follows. It first presents an overview of the relevant theoretical 
approaches on the use of cultural studies as a method in conducting research in political 
science, mainly focusing on the encoding/decoding model of Stuart Hall (chapter 2). This 
chapter also focuses on the importance and power of an image, an essence of the political 
discourse and the use of emotions in politics. The thesis then goes on to introduce the main 
motives behind the annexation of Crimea and the meaning of Crimea for the Russian 
identity in chapter 3. The paper introduces its methodological approach and research 
questions in chapter 4 before focusing on the encoding/decoding analysis of the two main 
cases in chapters 5 and 6 respectively. The following chapter of the thesis draws analytical 
conclusions by discussing both the narratives and the emotions used in the discourses 
(chapter 7). The thesis is then summed up in chapter 8. 
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2. Theoretical Approaches 
Since this thesis seeks to analyze and compare the narration of the annexation of the 
Crimean Peninsula by the Russian Federation in both leading political discourse and media 
discourse, the following chapter is going to present a prism through which the narration is 
going to be looked at. The chapter will also focus on the essence of both discourses and 
introduce an additional emotional factor in the narration of discourses. 
 2.1. Cultural Studies and Politics 
In order to research the interconnectivity between Russian political and media discourses 
towards Crimea and the use of emotions in the annexation narration, one should look 
beyond the simple realm of politics into the wider domain of culture. The use of historical 
memory, identity symbols, and a wide variety of cultural vocabulary and practices make the 
Russian discourse shaping process deeply influenced by the cultural domain. Since soft 
power and cultural measures have become increasingly popular tools for mass engagement 
tools by the Russian authorities, the domain of culture and its interdependence with politics 
should be explored first. 
Lister and Wells (2001: 61) see forms and practices of culture, their relationships to social 
groups, and the power relations between those groups as the main focus of the cultural 
studies. All of this behavior is therefore constructed and mediated by forms of culture. 
Going beyond simple descriptions, cultural studies is the search to understand the 
relationships of cultural production, consumption, belief and meaning, to social processes 
and institutions. Culture has therefore a constitutive role - it sustains and changes the power 
relations around many issues and examines these issues in terms of how people tie 
meanings to experiences, through seeing, imagining, classifying, and narrating. 
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Before going further into the discussion, it would be wise to at least try to define culture 
among thousands of meanings given to the term. Culture can be understood as the struggle 
over meaning, a struggle that takes place over and within the sign. Culture is ‘the particular 
pattern of relations established through the social use of things and techniques’ (Grossberg 
1996: 158). Considering all the nuances and many focuses of the definitions, culture must 
be understood primarily as something dynamic, with a power to, not only shape, but be 
shaped as well. 
It is widely believed that cultural studies emerged from the political and intellectual climate 
and situation of the Great Britain between the late 1950s and the 1970s. Saukko (2003: 13) 
highlights two main ways of understanding cultural studies back then: one was focused on 
capturing people’s lived worlds, the other was more focused on linguistic patterns and 
tropes that recur in texts, such as popular culture. However, New Leftism brought an 
interest in examining the connection between lived experience, a body of texts, and the 
larger social, political and economic environment, therefore offering a third philosophical 
current in cultural thinking. Saukko (2003: 19) concludes that ‘humanistic’, ‘structuralist’ 
and New Leftist ‘contextualist’ bents were the most influential in early cultural studies. 
Cultural Studies’ founding fathers were Richard Hoggart, Raymond Williams and, though 
himself young enough to be a son rather than a father, Stuart Hall (Stratton & Ang 1996: 
367). 
The connection between the political science and cultural studies is therefore evident. One 
influenced the emergence of another and their relationship and mutual impact on one 
another has grown more intense. The ability of cultural studies to explain power relations 
around issues such as giving meaning to the place, defining political developments etc. 
makes it a valuable ‘partner in crime’ for political science. The same has been highlighted 
by Jodi Dean (2006: 754), arguing that despite some institutional asymmetries, in the last 
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decades of the twentieth century there emerged an interface between them, useful for 
thinking about the inextricability of politics and culture.  
Despite the reciprocal relationship between the culture and politics, there often exists a 
certain misbalance, when it comes to the use of culture by politics. Of course, the use of 
culture by politicians does not necessarily have a negative connotation. The use of soft 
power and cultural dimension in the EU foreign policy is often considered an extremely 
positive example of culture-politics interaction. 
Still, there are examples of the politicization of culture and simply using culture as a 
political tool. Wright (1998: 9) brings an example of political meaning making in cultural 
sense. Firstly, identified agents attempt to redefine key symbols which give particular view 
of the world, of how people should be and behave, and what should be seen as the ‘reality’ 
of their society and history. This can be referred to as the transition of ideology. A second 
stage is when such view of the world becomes institutionalized, and lastly, when a key term 
with new meaning enters other domains and becomes a prevalent way of thinking. This 
way, politics uses cultural arsenal to get its way. 
As stated by Chen (1996: 310), culture is pervasively politicized on every front and every 
ground, hence a cultural politics. Cultural politics can be empowering and endangering, 
oppositional and hegemonic, therefore advocating it as the site of active struggle, every day 
and anywhere. Contemporary power networks can and do no longer work solely through an 
imposition from ‘above’ since it rather operates ‘on the ground’ and can only establish its 
hegemonic dominance through linking with local struggles. 
Similarly, Dean (2006: 752-753) mentions that the spectacularized politics of networked 
entertainment culture, on one hand, and the mass attractions of fundamentalist visions of 
community in the face of extreme economic division brings politics and culture closer 
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together. That often refers to coding culture in political terms and political theorists being 
fully absorbed with cultural politics and the politics of culture. For Chen (1996: 310), the 
cultural politics operates through the domains of representation, signification and ideology, 
which of course are the main keywords of the cultural studies’ research. 
To observe the interplay between lived experience, texts or discourses, and the social 
context in political and cultural interaction, it is useful to narrow down the focus to the 
British Cultural Studies (Saukko 2003: 11). The main theorist of this approach, Stuart Hall, 
has  influenced the development of the whole discipline. 
  
 2.2. British Cultural Studies and the Legacy of Stuart Hall 
Because of the universality of the cultural studies to look at all sorts of social phenomena, 
including the political realm, the following thesis takes cultural studies, specifically British 
Cultural Studies as the main theoretical prism. British Cultural Studies allows one to 
analyze political developments in the context of visual representations, turning its main 
focus to images and texts that are used as the main empirical resources in the following 
thesis. 
The birth of British cultural studies is generally associated with the 1964 founding of the 
Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies in Birmingham by Richard Hoggart and Stuart 
Hall. Dean (2006: 758) finds that inspired by Richard Hoggart’s The Uses of Literacy, 
Raymond Williams’ Culture and Society and The Long Revolution, and E. P. Thompson’s 
The Making of the English Working Class, cultural studies quickly became a sort of an 
umbrella for all of humanities.  
Generally speaking, the research associated with the Birmingham school focused on the 
processes shaping postwar British society, out of which the most significant ones were, the 
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increase in consumerism and resulting commodification of more domains of life, the rise of 
mass communications and racial and national forms of oppression. British Cultural Studies 
also found itself in a struggle with the classical Marxism, in a sense offering a corrective to 
Marxist essentialism, and providing a useful analysis of the construction of hegemony 
(Dean 2006: 759). 
As pointed out by Stratton and Ang (1996: 367) the success of Birmingham Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies was at its most evident during Hall’s ‘rule’ over the Centre 
where, cultural studies as an institutionalized intellectual practice first began. Hall’s 
contextualization of the Thatcher government in post-war Britain was an important corner-
stone for the whole discipline. Dean (2006: 760) stresses that Hall’s study of Thatcherism 
proves that it was the result of ideological struggle, a transformation and reconfiguration of 
right-wing discourses to enable a new way of thinking to be dominant. Hall (1988: 53) 
himself points out that understanding Thatcherism cannot be achieved through simply 
mapping the plurality of discourses (race, crime, nation, sexuality, market) that produce it 
within civil society. Rather, it is the formation of this plurality of ideological elements into 
a unity, or discursive formation, at the level of the state, that really makes the difference. 
Thatcherism was therefore a hegemonic structure with authority constituted through the 
production of common sense, hence involving producers and consumers. Analysis of 
Putin’s discourse, that is the main focus of the thesis, and is similar to what Hall did with 
Thatcherism, which is looking beyond the typical focus of politics, right into the realm of 
culture. 
Stuart Hall’s contribution to the development of the British Cultural Studies has been 
tremendous, to say the least. ‘‘Cultural studies is not one thing,’’ Stuart Hall asserts, ‘‘it has 
never been one thing’’ (Hall 1990: 11). This is a direct reference to the ability of the cultural 
studies to shape and change within the wider context of societal developments. Cultural 
studies have been interdisciplinary, constantly trying to integrate more and more aspects to 
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its analysis. The same can be said about Stuart Hall, whose ideas developed throughout his 
academic career. 
Hall’s approach is greatly relying on the contextualist validity, which refers to the capability 
of research to locate the phenomenon it is studying within the wider social, political, and 
even global, context (Saukko 2003: 21). In this light, Hall has picked texts as the main 
source of the analysis. With the help of this analytical approach, he has often tried to search 
deeper contexts in the existing textual products, therefore looking for codes, meanings, and 
ideologies. Hence, Hall has been interested in power relations encompassed in the texts, 
which will be researched in this paper as well. 
Saukko (2003: 100) emphasizes that Cultural studies’ specific approach to texts is partly 
explained by the fact that the Birmingham-period research on subcultures and popular 
culture coincided and became part of the golden age of the French semiotic movement. Hall 
(1996: 270) has even created a comprehensive list of the theoretical advances which were 
made by the encounters with structuralist, semiotic, and post-structuralist work, which 
involves “the crucial importance of language and of the linguistic metaphor to any study of 
culture; the expansion of the notion of text and textuality, both as a source of meaning, and 
as that which escapes and postpones meaning; the recognition of the heterogeneity, of the 
multiplicity, of meanings, of the struggle to close arbitrarily the infinite semiosis beyond 
meaning; the acknowledgment of textuality and cultural power, of representation itself, as a 
site of power and regulation; of the symbolic as a source of identity”. 
One of these universal units that semiotics contributed to the wider academic debate is the 
sign, constituting of the signifier and signified. For cultural studies, the relationship 
between the signifier and the signified was arbitrary and so to say “a matter of 
politics” (Saukko 2003: 101). Thus, signs could be interpreted differently in different con-
  !12
texts and by different groups. As mentioned earlier, it is the politics embedded in the 
signifier-signified relationship that interested cultural studies and Stuart Hall in particular. 
As highlighted by Hall (1996: 270) himself, there’s always something de-centered about the 
medium of culture, about language, textuality, and signification, which always escapes and 
evades the attempt to link it, directly and immediately, with other structures. And yet, at the 
same time, the shadow, the imprint, and the trace of those other formations, of the 
intertextuality of texts in their institutional positions, of texts as sources of power, of 
textuality as a site of representation and resistance, all questions that can never be erased 
from cultural studies. 
American Cultural Studies’ leading figure Lawrence Grossberg (1996: 157), who has 
widely researched the approaches of Stuart Hall and British Cultural Studies, argues that for 
Hall the meaning of a cultural form is not intrinsic to it. The meaning is not in the text itself 
but is the active product of the text’s social articulation, of the web of connotations and 
codes into which it is inserted. Therefore, it is possible to analyze any text, disseminating 
and fragmenting its meaning into its different contexts and codes, displacing any claim it 
makes to ‘have’ a meaning. Thus, every sign must be and is made to mean (Grossberg 
1996: 158). 
Since ideology of a text is not guaranteed, no text is free of its encoded structures and its 
ideological history. Often, texts have already appeared in some place and are therefore 
already inscribed or placed by that earlier positioning. According to Grossberg (1996: 161) 
Hall’s work increasingly draws attention to the historical fact of ‘hegemonic politics’, and 
the need to observe the processes by which a dominant cultural order is consistently 
preferred, despite it often being associated with structures of domination and oppression. 
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For British Cultural Studies and Stuart Hall, the appearance of hegemony is tied to the 
incorporation of the great majority of people into broadly based relations of cultural 
consumption. For that matter, hegemonic discourse of Putin in Russia should also be looked 
upon in the context of consumption of the Putin’s policies. As emphasized by Grossberg 
(1996: 162) the appearance of the masses as an agent in the scene of culture, displaces the 
field of cultural struggle from the expression of class conflict into a larger struggle between 
the people and the elite or ruling bloc. The ability of the ruling bloc to establish its political 
power is therefore firstly on the line, marking some influences from the Marxist thinking. 
The ultimate goal of the ruling bloc is therefore to win for itself the position of leadership 
across the entire terrain of cultural and political life, or establish hegemony in a sense of 
Hall’s understanding of the term. Hegemony involves the mobilization of popular support, 
by a particular social bloc, for the broad range of its social projects. In this way, the people 
assent to a particular social order and agree with a particular system of power. The interests 
of the ruling bloc come to define the leading positions of the people (Grossberg 1996: 163). 
Hence, at its most secure, an ideology appears hegemonic. That is, it becomes so 
naturalized, taken for granted and 'true' that alternatives are beyond the limits of the 
thinkable (Wright 1998: 9). It almost seems like current leading political discourse in 
Russia is a perfect example of naturalized hegemony with a tremendous support of the 
leading political party and Mr. Putin in particular. 
Since ideology involves the claim of particular cultural practices to represent reality, Hall 
wants to deliberately understand the way this ideology is inserted in texts and then 
interpreted by the audiences. Saukko (2003: 112) highlights that a frequent issue of concern 
in producer/audience-based approach of Hall is how to distinguish between the inserted 
meaning of a particular media text and the audience’s reading of the same text. Stuart Hall 
finds a solution to the following struggle in his 1973 published article “Encoding and 
Decoding in the Television Discourse”, which has been greatly influential to many scholars 
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within a wide range of disciplines. Hall’s encoding/decoding approach that focuses on 
encoded media and decoding viewers in many ways solves the issue that other approaches 
stumbled on, focusing on only producing meanings and not interpreting them as well. 
Before the analysis of encoding/decoding process, Hall (1973) stresses that the event 
cannot simply become a communicative event, but first, it must become a story. In a sense, 
a message is not a random moment and it definitely needs a form of appearance in order to 
pass from source to receiver. 
When researching encoding, Hall investigates cultural production indirectly. The focus is 
not on the particular individuals who produce culture but on the structures, external factors 
and high-level decision-makers which come to influence and shape mass-produced culture 
(Davis 2008: 54). The particular signifying practices of the text not only embody real 
historical choices, but also become the active sites for ideological struggles. As Hall (1973) 
himself puts it, there is no zero degree in language. Practices do not intrinsically belong to 
any political position or social identity; they must be articulated into it. Therefore such 
terms as, ‘democracy’, ‘freedom’, or ‘black’, are always capable of being de-articulated and 
re-articulated. The ones who deliver messages seek audiences or masses to interpret the 
messages the way they encoded them, and audiences misinterpreting the encoded meanings 
is a failure for producers. 
Cultural producers can be roughly compared with the message producers in Hall’s 
understanding. Cultural codes are inserted or encoded in the messages and then delivered to 
the audiences. While being delivered, the message can be considered to be a program with a 
meaningful discourse (Hall 1973). Before aiming at some effect, satisfy a need, or be put to 
use, the meaningful discourse is constructed. The set of meanings is then aimed at 
influencing, entertaining, persuading or instructing, also having complex ideological 
consequences during the cultural consumption. 
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Arguably, cultural consumption has especially increased because of the development and 
spread of new forms of media and information and communication technologies. These 
have in turn generated new forms of cultural texts and made cultural consumption more 
accessible. According to Meyer (2008: 68) cultural consumption includes a variety of 
practices, during which consumers have to make sense of products, hence they are 
producers of meanings. Because of the increased interest of cultural studies in cultural 
consumers, it is now used more often by qualitative methods to study processes such as 
attitude formation or meaning attribution. 
In Hall’ sense, media audiences and cultural consumers are often used interchangeably 
because of their extensive overlap. This is due to the fact that much of the culture consumed 
today is mediated, and cultural consumers, like media audiences, produce meanings and 
engage in a range of activities. This also denies a one-way model of communication in 
which texts are active producers of messages and consumers are passive recipients. Texts 
and consumers, as well as their inter-relationships, are more complex, since texts both 
reflect and generate certain representations; they create and reproduce culture (Meyer 2008: 
72). Similarly, cultural consumers both consume and produce meanings, once again 
affirming a complex nature of culture. 
In “Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse” Hall (1973) argues that audiences 
interact with media or ‘decode’ it in one of three ways: dominant-hegemonic, negotiated, or 
oppositional. In the first, meanings that viewers take away from the product are in sync 
with the messages the creators ‘encoded’ it to contain. Audiences are either unaware they 
are being given a message, or they are already in agreement with the encoded message. 
Negotiated decoding implies that audiences are aware of and understand the dominant 
meaning, and while they may see or agree with the importance of that message, they are 
also able to alter aspects to fit their own needs. Therefore, in this decoding process, both 
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intended and oppositional meanings apply. The last type of decoding involves audiences 
who may or may not understand the encoded meaning within the media, but regardless, 
reject it in order to employ an alternate and oppositional message. 
However, Hall (1973) also points out that there are certain type of codes that are so widely 
distributed in a specific language or culture, that they appear not to be constructed at all. 
Meanings are almost like ‘naturally’ given. By producing apparently natural recognitions, it 
is possible for the ones who encode the meaning to conceal the practice. It has an 
ideological effect, since the functioning of the codes on the decoding side will frequently 
assume the status of naturalized perceptions. 
Also, the produced and encoded messages can have an interesting relationship with the 
audience’s already existing ideologies. It is something that Hall (1973) describes as the 
level of connotation. It is the point where already coded signs intersect with deep semantic 
codes of a culture and take on additional, more active ideological dimensions. At precisely 
this level, the encoded ideology intertwines with existing culture, knowledge, and history. 
Simply put in the context of the following paper, one should not assume the fact that 
messages produced by Russian political discourse are somewhat unique or new for the 
audiences. on the contrary, meanings inserted in the messages often appear natural, such as 
an understanding of Russia as a model of traditional society. The relationship with the 
ideologies of the Russian audiences also can be trickier, since the level of connotation 
makes it hard to distinguish if the presented values were rooted in the society or are simply 
imposed by the authorities. 
Of course, Hall and the whole British Cultural Studies approach has its own share of 
criticism to bear. Stratton & Ang (1996: 370) question the universality of British Cultural 
Studies when it comes to analyzing international cases, Wren-Lewis (1983: 195) points out 
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a somewhat methodologically weak approach to analysis of decoding etc. Still, Hall’s 
model remains one of the most influential in the existing discipline. With its analysis of 
what can be the power of an image, how meanings are created and distributed, how 
ideologies are inculcated, ‘Birmingham’ still plays a crucial role in the growth of the 
international cultural studies. 
 2.3. Images and Texts 
Cultural studies in general and Stuart Hall’s approach in particular heavily focus on 
analyzing visual representations. Hall (1973) himself sees images and texts as products in 
the loop of the production process and highlights the privileged position of the discursive 
form of the message in the communicative exchange. Hence, image matters significantly in 
many ways. Focusing on the theoretical approaches to images and texts will allow to 
determine what should be the focus in their encoding/decoding analysis, how they should 
be approached as a research resource, and gain knowledge on their importance for political 
science. 
Approaches to understanding the significance of images can be extremely different. There 
are several layers in which the following analysis can take place. The most easily 
observable way of analyzing the power of image is simply stating its importance and 
capability to influence. O’Neill (2013: 10) believes that everyday life in world politics is 
replete with images and policy makers are attuned to their power. Simply put, the 
deployment of visual imagery can be a key tool for meaning-making, since they are the 
ones producing the wide array of emotions and responses, such as for example anger or 
disgust (Sturken & Cartwright 2009: 10). Hence, one image can have different meanings 
for different people in varying contexts. 
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Secondly, images have a deeper function of creating meanings and giving importance to 
depicted processes or phenomena. As pointed out by Norman Fairclough (1995: 103), texts 
and images do not simply mirror realities, but rather constitute versions of the reality that 
are deeply dependent on its producer’s social positions, interests, and objectives. Inevitably, 
several choices are made at the various levels in the process of producing texts or depicting 
images. Through images a certain importance is given to one or another aspect of social 
life, since images and texts can dictate the way in which social relations and political 
problems are defined. 
Images and texts also have a strong connection to the ideological aspect. Sturken & 
Cartwright (2009: 21) emphasize that visual culture is integral to ideologies and power 
relations. Through images and texts ideological constructions can be reinforced. 
Representations in imagery may be said to function ideologically in so far as they 
contribute to reproducing social relations of domination (Fairclough 1995: 44). Ideological 
representations are generally implicit rather than explicit in texts and images, and are 
embedded in the use of naturalized language. In a sense, the ideological language is 
perceived as a common sense by both presenters and audiences. It allows some assumptions 
to become completely normal and natural, despite having a deeper ideological sense. 
Because of the power to insert a meaning into an image or text, an important aspect is the 
production of visual imagery and textual material. The media can mostly be considered a 
leading developer of the messages targeting the audiences. Still, there exists a certain level 
of complicity between the media and dominant social classes and groups, and as pointed 
out by Fairclough (1995: 45), the state has a great interest in controlling media output that 
is extremely evident in case of Putin’s Russia. Not only is media hugely effective in 
mobilizing big audiences, but also its ideological potential should not be underestimated. 
Still, attempts at state control can be quite different. They vary from being extremely direct 
to less invasive.  
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Louw (2005: 202) finds that since simply producing knowledge is not enough, those in 
power require media to popularize and naturalize appropriate ideas, discourses and 
practices. When it comes to the use of politics in media discourses, Fairclough (1995: 44) 
brings out that audiences are more and more perceived as spectators, rather than 
participants, and are addressed as consumers. According to Louw (2005: 228), with the help 
of visual representations, it is not only possible to sell political policies, beliefs, and larger 
world-views, but even legitimize and justify military action. In fact, Corner and Pels (2003: 
3) stress that there has been a great shift in political communication and the whole nature of 
media-political relations. It is precisely through visual representations that politicians 
mediate their personas, exchange political outputs, and try to mobilize and influence 
audiences. 
Hence, there exists a controversy over absolute independence of media discourses from the 
influence of leading political discourses, which should also be taken into account when 
talking about political and media discourse of Russia towards Crimea. Media images can in 
a sense merely play the passive role of illustrations to dominant news frames and official 
political discourse. Images which contradict or disrupt a dominant discursive frame might 
have a considerable impact, if not directly on politics and policy-making, then more so on 
popular imagination and historical consciousness (Andén-Papadopoulos 2012: 61). It can 
therefore be argued that media discourses can merely take over the existing political 
discourse’s vocabulary, fully embracing a leading ideological approach. 
There of course exist several types of visual representations that can be used to target the 
consumers of these messages. Since coded culture and language are contained in all forms 
of social interaction, images and texts for analysis can be found in a range of media forms 
and social settings. Many of the early cultural studies, as well as semiotic literature, 
analyzed the way in which meaning is constituted in popular texts and images, such as 
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photographs, films and popular culture (Saukko 2003: 101). Musical lyrics, clothing, 
political speeches, posters, popular magazines and geographical layouts have all been 
recorded and analyzed as texts and images (Davis 2008: 56). 
Analysis of cultural outputs can be a great way to investigate cultural production. This 
involves analyzing a series of printed, visual or audio texts. As with political economy 
approaches, cultural production is investigated indirectly. Wider deductions about the 
production (and also consumption) process are inferred from assessments of what is 
produced. In analyzing texts and images researchers seek to highlight the common codes, 
terms, ideologies, discourses and individuals that come to dominate cultural outputs. What 
can be said about the individuals featured in the texts? Who are the contributors to the text? 
How are the texts framed and presented? What are the terms and phrases used and what is 
their symbolic meaning? What are the assumptions embedded in the texts? The answers to 
such questions, gathered from analysis, are then used to build arguments about those who 
construct cultural products and wider social, cultural and linguistic conditions (Davis 2008: 
56). 
Nevertheless, as stressed by Fairclough (1995: 47), analyzing media discourse involves 
comparing and evaluating representations, in terms of what they include and what they 
exclude, what they foreground and what they background, where they come from and what 
factors and interests influence their formulation and projection and so on. Since all the 
representations involve views, values, and goals, analyzing them allows to determine their 
truthfulness and partiality. 
Analyzing texts can assume much more than it should about the conditions of cultural 
production and consumption. Davis (2008: 58) finds that in the past rather grand claims 
about material and cultural relations have been deduced from limited and unrepresentative 
selections of texts. However, if properly applied, quite strong cases and historical accounts 
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can be developed, since selection and collection of texts is relatively easy and this allows 
greater choice and flexibility for the researcher. The nature and role of language in texts 
should not be forgotten considering the power of such systems to shape identities, social 
practices, relations between individuals, communities, and all kinds of authority (Barker 
2008: 152). 
For Pink (2008: 125), looking at a combination of the images is much more effective in 
terms of producing cultural codes and its potential consumption. The combination of 
spoken words and visual images provide the researcher with a better understanding of the 
functions of the visual representation. Heath, Hindmarsh and Luff (2010: 5) emphasize 
several reasons why visual content has become an effective tool for analyzing social and 
political reality. Firstly, it captures an event as it happens and records social activities, such 
as talk, visible conduct, and the use of tools, technologies, objects and artifacts. It is a great 
tool for researchers who aim at capturing several forms of interaction. It allows researchers 
to interpret the content of the message again and again, adding several meanings and 
aspects of meaning. Fairclough (1995: 45) especially points out an ability of documentaries 
to adopt a particular point of view on its topic and use rhetorical devices to persuade 
audience to see things that way as well. 
Because of the active use of images and texts by the political discourses and the possible 
overtake of the ideologies from one discourse to another, it is important to have a brief look 
at the essence of political discourse, its main objectives, and ways of expression. 
 2.4. Political Discourses and Ideologies 
Briefly focusing on the essence of the political discourse, it’s main ways of representations, 
and producers will help to find focal points in the analysis of this discourse, highlighting 
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important aspects to build assumptions upon, and generate an understanding of how 
political discourse influences other discourses. Applying Stuart Hall’s approach to 
analyzing political discourse is an interesting new way of understanding political 
propaganda, allowing to add the interpretation of the audience reactions to consumed 
political messages. Unwrapping the essence of political discourse will also allow to later 
understand what Russian political discourse is all about, what focal points should be kept in 
mind while conducting an analysis of Russian discourse towards Crimea through the prism 
of Stuart Hall’s approach. 
Undoubtedly one of the leading academics on political discourse, Teun A. van Dijk (1997: 
12) finds that the easiest, and not altogether misguided definition of political discourse can 
be identified by its actors or authors, simply politicians who are being paid for their 
activities, and who are being elected or appointed as the central players in the polity. It 
would also be wise to include the various recipients in political communicative events, such 
as the public, the people, citizens, the ‘masses’, and other groups or categories. That is, 
once we locate politics and its discourses in the public sphere, many more participants in 
political communication appear on the stage. 
A slight narrowing of the actors is necessary, since only politically acting participants 
influence the creation of certain political discourse. Van Dijk (1997: 14) stresses that the 
context is decisive for the categorization of discourse as 'political' or not. Participants and 
actions are the core of such contexts, but contexts can also be analyzed broadly in terms of 
political and communicative events and encounters, with their own settings (time, place, 
circumstances), occasions, intentions, functions, goals, and legal or political implications. 
Just like Hall (1973) sees a message getting its form in the special moment and context, it is 
the text plus context that classifies the discourse as political. 
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Wodak (2009: 24) identifies six dimensions of politics that are deeply connected to 
producing a political discourse. These are: 1) the staging/performance of politics (the front 
stage); 2) everyday life of politics and politicians (the back stage); 3) the impact of 
politicians’ personality on performance; 4) the mass-production of politics; 5) the 
re-contextualization of politics in the media, and 6) participation in politics. To the 
following list, Isabela and Norman Fairclough (2012: 22) are eager to add one more 
dimension, which is that politics is oriented towards decision-making that can ground 
action. Political theory also implicates the following list by stating that politics is both 
normative and descriptive.  
One of the hottest topics is identifying leading figures in the discourse production or those 
who act politically. Since there are various levels and dimensions in the political domain, 
identifying a single producer might be tricky. Van Dijk (2002b: 204) recognizes these levels 
as, firstly, the base level, which consists of individual political actors, as well as their 
beliefs, discourses and interactions in political situations. Secondly, the intermediate level, 
constituted by the base level, which consists of political groups and institutions, as well as 
their shared representations, collective discourse, relations and interactions. Lastly, the top 
level, which in turn is based on the intermediate level and which is constituted by political 
systems, and their abstract representations, orders of discourse, and socio-political, cultural 
and historical processes.  
These levels are also extremely well visible in the Russian case. The political figure of 
Vladimir Putin stands out strong in what is believed to be Russian politics and it is also 
supported by the intermediate level, which is mainly perceived being the leading Russian 
party, United Russia. The top level of what can be considered Russian politics is much 
trickier to highlight, since it also involves deeper beliefs in the society. Nevertheless, some 
general trends such as traditionalism and support of the presidency and tougher authority 
can be detected. 
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In discourse production, van Dijk (2002b: 211) assumes that speakers or writers will 
generally start from their personal mental model of an event or situation. This model 
organizes the subjective beliefs of the speaker about such a situation. Next, the presented 
model composes shared social and political beliefs of general public and also specific 
groups. Once such a personal model of an event or situation is constituted, presenters may 
express fragments of such models in discourse, using a number of detailed linguistic and 
discursive strategies, which however does not mean that all information presenters possess 
about an event or a situation is revealed. Van Dijk (2002b: 212) also stresses that the 
process of discourse production also apply to discourse understanding. 
Despite seemingly easy classification, the levels function in a very related manner. It means 
that one discourse can be shared on all the levels. For example, if a political representative 
gives a speech, it represents himself, his institution and, in a sense, the whole political 
system. Thus, targeting an audience with a particular message leaves audience with an 
understanding that the presented discourse is intrinsic to all of the ‘functions’ or ‘levels’ of 
the speaker. 
Talking about the ultimate goals and functions of the political discourse, Teun A. van Dijk 
(2002a: 15) states that probably more than any other kind of discourse, political discourse is 
eminently ideological. Ideology in this sense can rather be understood as the basis of the 
social representations shared by members of a group or simply a system of beliefs (van 
Dijk 1998: 8-9). Political discourse and its properties are controlled by one or more 
underlying ideologies. In here, the levels of production play an important role 
understanding the core of ideology in the discourse, since different levels may presuppose 
different kinds of ideologies. Still, political discourse functions as the way of construction 
of ideological identity. With the help of text or words a presenter can state the core of the 
values, beliefs, and priorities of his ideology, thus constructing the essence of his ‘me’. 
Political discourse is thus an active tool of active reproduction of ideological identity. 
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When certain individuals or groups in a society embrace some ideology because it enables 
them to achieve their goals, these ideological beliefs are often presented as belonging to the 
realm of the common sense and therefore the only ones possible (Matić 2012: 55). 
Language, therefore, proves to be very important in presenting and ‘selling’ political 
discourse and one of the most important means of domination and control. For that reason, 
politicians tend to politicize the public by speeches or interviews with dramatic overtones. 
There are several genres used in presenting discourses to the audiences, such as political 
interviews, political speeches, policy documents, and public sphere dialogues (Fairclough 
2006:  34). Many authors find that the speech acts as the main way of expressing one’s 
political discourse. For example, Lerman (1985: 185) finds that the speech of a political 
head of state is one of the most significant forms of mass communication, the only form of 
direct communication between the symbol of political power, authority, and the people. 
Dedaic (2006: 700) emphasizes political speech’s power to represent relatively autonomous 
discourse produced orally by a politician in front of an audience, the purpose of which is 
primarily persuasion rather than information or entertainment. 
There are also different tools used in the speeches that help deliver the messages to the 
public in the most efficient manner. The speaker can employ arguments and rhetorical 
devices, such as evidence, lines of reasoning, and appeals that help him present the core of 
his discourse (Dedaic 2006: 702). Reisigl (2006: 599) point out that rhetorical tropes or 
means of expressing ‘nonliteral speech’ such as metaphors, fulfill many different purposes 
in political discourses, especially in regard to positive political self-presentation and 
negative political other-presentation. Tropes help to ‘invent’ or construct a political reality, 
promote the identification with single or collective political actors as well as with their 
political aims and ideologies, refer to the imagined community, to influence the feelings of 
the audience etc. Chilton (2006: 64) gives the use of metaphors in speeches a whole new 
life, referring to them as cognitive phenomenon and thus pointing out the use of bodily- 
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referred words such as way forward, leadership, right decision, falling behind etc. in the 
speeches. Wodak and de Cillia (2006: 717) also emphasize such tricks used by the language 
in speeches as construction of in-groups and out-groups, membership categorization, 
biological naturalizing and depersonalizing, giving stereotypical, evaluative attributions of 
negative or positive traits, reporting, describing, narrating, or quoting of events and 
utterances. 
Considering the fact that there is no surprise in the fact that all the political addresses are 
carefully thought through, the use of rhetorical tricks and grand political addresses by the 
state leader are very well visible in the case of Putin and Russia. The question here is not if 
these methods are used, but how are they used in Russia’s case, specifically concerning 
Crimea. The Russian leader’s speeches are often very informative and emotional, allowing 
to understand not only his personal views, but guidance and an ideological imposition on 
the grand narrative of the whole country. 
What has been implied by both political discourses and visual media discourses, is a strong 
will to influence its audiences by presenting ideological messages to them. These messages 
in the form of images and texts are often filled with strong statements and rather heavy 
content. In order to make these messages not only heard, but embraced and further 
reproduced by the audience, public addresses can be further loaded and charged with 
something allowing the messages to be heard even more thoroughly - with emotions. 
 2.5. Politics of Emotions 
Adding emotional aspect to Stuart Hall’s approach gives an extra value to evaluating and 
analyzing the encoding/decoding process in the Russian narrative of the Crimean 
annexation. Since the only element ‘in between’ encoding and decoding is a general 
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meaningful discourse, analyzing emotions can be an important contribution of the 
following thesis, shedding a light on the deeper processes in encoding/decoding. 
Henderson (2008: 30) emphasizes that when emotions are unpacked, their political contours 
come into view. This relationship and its effect is reciprocal. Several scholars stress the 
importance of emotions in world politics (Bleiker & Hutchison 2008: 115, Berezin 2002: 
34, Manning & Holmes 2014: 699 et al.). Nearly all of the scholars who believe in the 
importance of the emotions in politics also stress how unfairly emotions have been 
neglected by the political science. 
As pointed out by Jack Barbalet (2006: 31), politics has always had an emotional element, 
but studying emotionality of politics has rather been one-sided, focusing more on the 
segment of political population, mainly referred to as simply ‘masses’. It often referred to 
political elites as rational and therefore not acknowledging the importance of underlying 
emotions of political elites, which leads to misinterpreting the promotion of state’s actions 
and decisions. Also, there exists an exaggerated stress on the emotion of fear because of the 
perception of the state as an ultimate authority, which is also misleading. 
James M. Jasper (2006: 15) finds that emotions are an important micro-foundation upon 
which more complex political processes and outcomes depend. There are several types of 
emotions that can influence politics. On a micro-level, it is more useful to categorize 
emotions into clusters according to the intensity of their relevance to politics. According to 
Jasper (2006: 17) emotion clusters such as urges and reflex emotions do not have such a 
great effect on political developments as for example moods or moral emotions. Moods are 
a more long-lasting set of emotions. Disgust, fear, anger, compassion, justice, shame, and 
pride should rather be considered moral emotions. Moral emotions represent explicit 
principles that human beings possess and therefore can target bigger audiences. 
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As indicated, some emotions possess a bigger political influence than the others. Among all 
the emotions, anger can play the most important role in politics (Ost 2004: 230). According 
to Thompson (2006: 123), anger is an essential political emotion, because it is a response to 
perceived injustice. Anger can not only mobilize people to engage in political action, but 
also to fight fiercely perceived injustice. Humphrey (2001: 332) emphasizes the ability of 
anger to influence the feelings of inequality and exclusion. Henderson (2008: 29) also 
stresses that because anger seems to have been so effectively displaced in favor of a politics 
of hope that scholars should pay greater attention to its possibilities and question ever more 
closely how it is managed. 
The sense of inequality and exclusion may in result lead to the negative set of emotions 
characterized as trauma or victimization. Representations of trauma can generate widely 
shared meanings, which in turn underpin political identity and community. Edkins (2006: 
101) suggests that analyzing traumatic memory can be central to understanding different 
forms of political authority. Popular representations can mediate and attribute trauma with 
emotional meanings that are crucial to the construction or consolidation of wider political 
community (Hutchison 2010: 66). This indicates that negative emotions are very strongly 
used by the narrators to get their political messages through. 
Barbalet (2006: 33) states that many politically relevant emotions are frequently 
experienced over long periods of time, which directly links emotional politics to 
developments in history and to the concept of memory. Bleiker & Hutchison (2008: 122), 
for instance, stress that emotions, and the situation in which they become political, are 
linked to particular historical, political and cultural circumstances, which is not surprising 
in Russian case, where historicism and memory have an extremely important role in the 
country’s politics. With the help of emotions, analysis of contemporary uses and 
manifestations of the past in contemporary culture, including media representations of the 
past and versions of the past is possible (Pickering 2008: 194). Unsurprisingly, studying 
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memory as well is becoming increasingly common in the fields of political and cultural 
studies. In contemporary academia the resurgence of memory is not so much contested in 
terms of its occurrence but in terms of its implications for the construction of individual and 
collective temporal identities and historically rooted cultures (Keightley 2008: 175). 
Keightley (2008: 176) also stresses that the relationship between memory and social 
environment is not a one-way flow: although what is remembered is dictated by the groups 
in which people participate, remembering also has a social function in the present. By 
remembering according to particular social conventions, those conventions are constantly 
being affirmed and re-constructed. The remembering agent is always the occupant of a 
particular social position or role, necessarily shaping their ideas and knowledge about the 
past. In order for memory to exist and have any role in lived experience it must be 
represented and communicated (Keightley 2008: 177). This is often achieved through using 
emotional historical narratives that coincide with the wider beliefs of the society. Memory 
also often relies upon a strong emotion of pride, which can also be an objective of the 
remembering object and is no stranger to Russian political discourse. 
It is also important to highlight the relationship between emotions and particular cultures. 
Cultural distinctions can be marked by differences in particular emotional reactions. 
Despite the danger of creating stereotypes, the following relation between the cultural and 
emotional patterns should not be ignored. Barbalet (2006: 37) even argues that rather than 
observing culture in order to explain what emotions predominate, the emotional factor 
should be taken as a basis for characterizing or explaining culture. It is not unusual that 
Russian society and culture often embraces an image of being emotional and is not afraid of 
that kind of references about itself. Remembering history, and doing it emotionally, is 
definitely something Russian society can easily identify with.  
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One of the best ways to study emotions in politics according to Bleiker & Hutchison (2008: 
122) is via observing numerous ways in which emotions are communicated, from political 
speeches and constitutional declarations to protest marches and televised depictions of 
famine, terrorism or any other major political event. Representations give perhaps the best 
understanding about the use of emotions in politics, since they matter and that they do so in 
a highly politicized manner. Bleiker & Hutchison (2008: 122) even believe that the real 
political battles today are being fought precisely within these visual and seemingly 
imaginary fields of media representations, where coded messages shape understandings of 
political phenomena more so than the actual phenomena themselves. 
There are other ways to observe and understand emotions in politics. A very interesting 
point has been made by Solomon (2014: 729), who argues that a set of emotions he refers 
to as ‘affect’ play a role of sort of a ‘glue’ between message deliverers and the audiences. 
Language must be infused with some emotions, in order for it to have the ‘force’ that it 
often has. Put differently, words alone often cannot carry the power that they often have — 
the force of emotions is needed to explain how words resonate with audiences and have 
political effects beyond their mere verbal utterance as such. Thus, emotions should not be 
separated from the relationship of the presenter and receiver, encoder and decoder. 
As presented above, there are theoretical concepts that might be useful to explain how 
political messages of the existing ideology can be coded in cultural texts and image, 
additionally using emotions. Before applying the approach of Stuart Hall to a case of 
narration of the annexation of Crimea by Russia, it is useful to have a quick look at the 
background of the case highlighted in the upcoming chapter. 
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3. Russian Annexation of the Crimean Peninsula 
Russia’s deployment of military forces within the sovereign territory of the Ukraine, its 
ordering of Ukrainian forces to withdraw from the Crimean Peninsula and its occupation 
and annexation of Crimea have been described by the international community as violations 
of international law. Yet Russia has defended itself arguing that it has not acted contrary to 
international law. First, Russia stated that it acted in defense of Russian speakers residing in 
Crimea. Then, Russia stated that its use of force was in response to a request for military 
assistance by the democratically elected head of the Ukrainian State. Later, Russia argued 
that it never used military force in the Ukraine; rather, it was local Ukrainian militias that 
stormed and occupied Ukrainian military bases. Finally, Russia argued that the annexation 
of the Crimea was achieved by a democratic referendum in which over 97% of Crimeans 
voted to voluntarily separate from Ukraine and join Russia as a federal subject. 
Whatever the explanation was, the process of overtaking the Crimean peninsula took place 
step by step. Russia’s explanations always involved different reasons and narratives. The 
annexation was narrated especially actively after Crimea was already a part of Russia, with 
politicians, media, and other influencers of the popular opinion explaining why Crimea has 
always been an organic part of the Russian State. 
The next chapter will briefly focus on the meaning-making of the annexation by the 
Russian authorities. It is crucial to explain why against all odds, tremendous international 
pressure, and clear irrationality of the Crimean annexation Russia still shocked the world 
with one of the biggest ‘checkmates’ in the modern history of international relations. 
Perhaps, the annexation was not just a sheer step of power-politics, but a whole new page in 
the Russian way of thinking in international relations will go from now on. Perhaps, the 
annexation was even more than Russia bargained for - it is a whole new way of defining the 
identity of oneself. 
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 3.1. Balancing pragmatism and emotions in Russian political discourse towards 
Crimea 
According to the independent report of the late Boris Nemtsov and hiss colleagues (2015: 
15), despite the fact that the annexation of Crimea would have meant a violation of three 
international agreements signed by Russia (The Budapest Memorandum on Security 
Assurances signed on 5 December 1994, Treaty on friendship, cooperation and partnership 
between the Russian Federation and Ukraine signed on 31 May 1997, and Treaty Between 
the Russian Federation and Ukraine on the Russian-Ukrainian State Border signed on 28 
January 2003) the annexation was a carefully planned military operation. It was never a 
spontaneous decision, but an operation where all the risks and possible reactions by the 
international community were taken into account. 
In this light, it is crucial to ask what the main motivation to take such an enormous step was 
and what were the considerations. Perhaps, firstly one should look at the simple numbers to 
understand if annexation was rationally calculated. The annexation of Crimea has a 
potential to bring Russia some financial benefits. A need to pay Ukraine the annual $97 
million to station the Black Sea Fleet on the peninsula disappeared. Russia thus gained an 
opportunity to modernize the Fleet in any way it sees fit, which so far had been limited by 
the Russian-Ukrainian agreement which only provided for the possibility of renovating the 
equipment that was already there (Olszański & Wierzbowska-Miazga 2014). By gaining 
control over Crimea, Russia will eliminate the annual $15 million passage cost of ships 
through the Kerch-Yenikal Canal, along with taking over the peninsula’s entire 
infrastructure and the property of the Ukrainian state. The Center for Strategic and 
International Studies’ expert Paul Schwartz (2014) also believes that control of Crimea 
provides Russia with important strategic defense capabilities. 
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However, Alexei Kudrin, Russia's former finance minister and head of the Civil Initiatives 
Committee, has said that the funding of annexed Crimea will cost Russia $6-7 billion 
annually, and the total cost to Russia could even reach $150-200 billion in three or four 
years (Kudrin: Russia may lose… 2015). Of course, this calculation is extremely 
approximate, since losses can be direct and indirect, such as losses related to the economic 
sanctions, the undermining of confidence in the Russian economy and politics etc. A 
non-existing economic rationale has also been pointed out by BBC’s Richard Galpin 
(2015), who draws attention to a stunning 16.7% inflation rate rise since the annexation. 
For regular Russians, it means about 5% decrease in their annual salary (Сколько для 
России стоила аннексия Крыма 2014). Hence, the annexation per se hardly promised any 
long-time economic benefits to the Russian government.  
Olszański and Wierzbowska-Miazga (2014) stress that apart from the need for direct 
financial outlays, Russia’s annexation of Crimea also creates administrative and 
organizational problems. Issues with border infrastructure and the defense and demarcation 
of the borders need to be solved. Since Ukraine should be a party to most of the 
agreements, but does not recognize the annexation of Crimea, it will be extremely hard to 
achieve.  
Perhaps, the rationale behind the sudden move from Russia had political motives? The 
answer to this question is both yes and no. Political reactions from the international 
community were everything but great. In fact, they were somewhat devastating. The 
expulsion of Russia from the G8 came three days after Moscow annexed Crimea from 
Ukraine says quite a lot about the position of world leaders. It seems that the West simply 
reinforced for itself the image of Russia as an unpredictable and dangerous country. The 
annexation of Crimea has strengthened the concerns of leaders of post-Soviet states about 
Russia since many of them seek to reduce their dependence on Moscow by efforts to 
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strengthen their cooperation with alternative international partners (Olszański & 
Wierzbowska-Miazga 2014). 
Contrary to international reaction, the annexation of Crimea was a huge domestic 
propaganda success and has translated into real support for Vladimir Putin among both the 
general public and the elite. Nemtsov (2015: 5) mentions that concerned about the negative 
trend of Putin’s post-election popularity decrease, Kremlin needed new means of 
strengthening Putin’s electoral position. Considering the existing Russian imperial 
sentiments and strongly promoted myth of the unity of the so-called ‘Russian world,’ 
adding Crimea to Russian territory was undoubtedly a big success (Olszański & 
Wierzbowska-Miazga 2014). Kremlin surely feels like it strengthened its geopolitical 
position by the annexation of Crimea, positioning Russia as a country ready to actively 
defend the implementation of its interests in the international arena. 
There definitely was balancing of all the gains and losses coming from the annexation done 
by pragmatically thinking Kremlin, it is just hard to say how well it was done. Still, as seen 
from the example of gaining popular support and strengthening Russian identity, the 
annexation of Crimea also signified a huge emotional outburst. Sharafutdinova (2014: 2) 
emphasizes that taking emotions into account allows for making sense of the rationality of 
particular actions that otherwise might appear irrational and difficult to comprehend. 
Therefore, focusing on the economic and political burdens associated with integrating 
Crimea into Russia, Putin’s actions indeed seem irrational. However, if interests are tied to 
identity, history, and memory, the focus changes completely. Putin’s actions magically 
become more sensible as they placed the Crimea issue right at the core of Russia’s struggles 
with its national identity, post-imperial legacies, and the emotional trauma Russian society 
experienced after the breakup of the Soviet Union. 
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Similar remarks have been done by Humphrey (2001: 335), who finds that emotions among 
the public about the nature of the polity are, for Putin, a reality – a force to be used. 
Discussions about the Russian idea, patriotism, belief in the greatness of Russia, statism 
and social solidarity are indeed very usual in the leading political discourse. The emotional 
state of the society is targeted with professional propaganda, specifically aiming at 
increasing the level of public anxiety and reviving historically-rooted national fears and 
hatreds associated with fascism and World War II. Because of the perceived loss of the 
international status and the nostalgia over past glory and greatness of the Soviet Union, the 
return of Crimea feels like a morally superior, responsible, and justified action on Russia’s 
part (Sharafutdinova 2014: 3). 
Leading Russian political discourse towards Crimea is indeed not only about pragmatism 
and rationality versus emotions, but rather it is balancing between the two. Indeed, Crimea 
has become an important part of the Russian political discourse in general, almost 
indicating it being a crucial point for the whole Russian identity construction. 
 3.2. Crimea as an assertive point of the shift in Russian identity 
The speed and intensity of the Crimean peninsula’s rise in the status of crucial part of  the 
Russian history, identity, and statehood is something of a phenomenon in the modern 
history of international relations. Something that was mainly associated by Russians with 
sun, beach, and occasional glass of wine rose in the status of ‘do or die’ for the Russian 
consciousness. It almost seems like in a matter of seconds, Crimea became more than just a 
geographical place - it became a denominator of the Russian identity and so to say ‘litmus 
paper’ for understanding if one belongs to the category of us or them. 
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Understanding this shift in the discourse towards Crimea is crucial in explaining the 
narratives used during the annexation process of the peninsula. Engström (2014: 356) finds 
that general re-ideologization in Russia was already visible at the beginning of Vladimir 
Putin’s third term as president of the Russian Federation in 2012, but started to get more 
attention in connection with the Ukrainian crisis and annexation of Crimea by the Russian 
Federation in March 2014. In this light, Osborn (2014) emphasizes that the peninsula's 
importance to Putin and to Russia, from a historical, military and geopolitical point of view 
- and for how Russians see themselves - is hard to overstate. 
Richards (2014) believes that Russia’s national identity is tied up in its geography. 
Confronted with a sprawling landmass, with few clear borders and a patchwork of different 
ethnicities, Russian governments have tried to build a coherent national identity using three 
touchstones: religion, war, and art. Crimea has not that surprisingly identified playing a 
significant part in all three. In this light, it would be wise to highlight very briefly general 
ways in which Russian identity-building has lately been directed. 
Since a raise of patriotic upbringing in Putin’s Russia can be indicated, nostalgia over 
Soviet times and revisionist moods have been identified as important parts of the Russian 
foreign policy by several scholars (Nikolayenko 2008: 256, Holak, Matveev & Havlena 
2007: 650, Kappeler 2014: 114 et al.). Political propaganda of a historic nature has formed 
an essential part of communication policy in Russia, involving patriotic education and the 
active use of historical memory in building state’s identity (Vázquez Liñán 2010: 176). 
Similarly to the Soviet times, the youth has actively been politicized and involved in the 
state’s identity building process (Levintova & Butterfield 2010: 140). 
Very closely tied to the Soviet nostalgia concept is something that has been described by 
Urnov (2014: 305) as the expression ‘greatpowerness.’ This denotes one of the most 
important components of Russian self-consciousness: a belief that Russia is or has to be a 
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great power. The process of ‘being and thinking big’ is embedded in the imperial legacy of 
the country and reassured by the Russia's hegemonic status in the former Soviet Union 
(Clunan 2014: 284). The great power image involves several important elements such as 
status, power resources/capabilities, set of images, and set of roles (Urnov 2014: 306-307). 
Forsberg, Heller & Wolf (2014: 261) even believe that restoring and strengthening its 
position as a great power has undoubtedly become Russia’s primary goal in world politics. 
Being a great power also means that the Russian identity has to go beyond Russia’s borders 
(Biersack & O’Lear 2015: 254). This is reassured by the significant amount of Russian 
speaking population outside of the Russian borders. Russia is seen as the main identity- 
constituting unity for these people, united by the same past, culture, and religion. Engström 
(2014: 370) points out that so-called Russian Orthodox civilization, and the modern state 
has to use both resources, the Orthodox tradition and the best elements of the Soviet period 
to construct the one big narrative of being ‘Russian.’ 
Despite it’s greatness, Russia is thought to be treated rather unfairly. Prozorov (2007: 310) 
stresses Russia’s tendency to victimize itself by embracing a role of the excluded country 
from the actual decision making in the world politics. Traumas also involve the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union, losing big territories and populations. The demonization of the West is 
something very usual in multiple Russian discourses and gives way to the ‘us and them’ 
polarization. 
All of that makes Russia unique and different. Russia is seen as an alternative, more 
traditionalist way of opposing the category of ‘them’ often referring to the West. For 
example, Russian nonlinear warfare that calls for an increasing importance of nonmilitary 
means in achieving political and strategic goals (Biersack & O’Lear 2015: 253) is seen as 
opposing hard-power Western approach. Russia’s way of understanding oneself as a unique 
entity can be traced back to several political theorists and is being actively reproduced by 
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the Russian president Vladimir Putin, for example via presenting his own Development 
Strategy for Russian Civilization. 
In this colorful picture of crossed identities, fitting Crimea may seem like an impossible 
task. However, the production of the annexation narratives actually involved nearly all of 
the main facets of the Russian identity. Paradoxically, Crimean discourse fits perfectly in 
the overall context, because it seems like every part of the puzzle fitted perfectly. Crimean 
annexation is a crucial point for the Russian identity construction, because never before has 
everything ‘said out loud’ actually worked. Everything, gaining unfairly taken territory, 
protecting Russian speakers, gaining historically important sights etc. seemed legitimate 
reasons to take a part of another country. It seemed correct for the authorities and for the 
Russian people. For Russia, which for the first time since the collapse of the USSR has not 
lost territory, but gained it, the annexation was a victory for the existing ideology and 
constructed identity.  
Sharafutdinova (2014: 2) ironically describes Crimea as a newly-found public fetish 
representing the recovery of the lost pride and prestige associated with the Soviet Union. 
Crimea quickly became an organic, historical, political, linguistic, cultural, geographical 
and religious part of Russia, something that should have never been questioned. Ovation 
and dangerous reassurance by the people to the authorities was given, leaving the 
international community holding their breath over the next possible ‘victorious’ moves of 
‘the Russian way.’ 
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4. Research Method and Questions 
This thesis seeks to look into how the annexation of the Crimean peninsula was narrated by 
the leading Russian political discourse and media discourse by examining two cases that 
represent the above mentioned discourses respectively. Based on the corresponding 
literature, 1) a political speech (March 18th address of President of Russian Federation, 
Vladimir Putin of State Duma deputies, Federation Council members, heads of Russian 
regions and civil society representatives in the Kremlin) was selected as a case representing 
a leading political discourse, and 2) a documentary (“Crimea: The Road Back Home” by 
Andrey Kondrashov released in March 2015) was chosen to represent the media discourse.  
There are several reasons why the following cases were chosen to observe the narration of 
the Crimean annexation. Firstly, visual and textual representations are extremely actively 
used by the current Russian authorities, which means that their political ideology is actively 
reproduced via TV channels, radio stations and other forms of political performance. The 
speech of Vladimir Putin used as one of the cases got a tremendous amount of feedback 
from the international community and Russian audiences. It is a masterpiece of not only 
explaining the annexation of Crimea, but constructing the whole image of current Russian 
self-consciousness. Similarly, the documentary film was allegedly watched in almost every 
second(!) household in Russia, meaning a huge amount of feedback and decodings 
respectively. Just like the speech, Kondrashov’s documentary became a hot topic not only 
in Russia, but abroad as well, often being referred to as showing multiple facets of Russian 
identity-building process. 
Inspired by the opportunities of the theoretical approach and topicality of the following 
subject outlined before, the main research question is the following: 
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How is the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation narrated in the leading 
political discourse and media discourse? 
The research question is further elaborated by looking into the following sub-questions: 
• How much does the leading political discourse of the Crimean annexation coincide with 
the media discourse? 
• What is the role of emotions in encoding and decoding of the annexation in both the lead-
ing political and media discourses? 
In order to find answers to the following research questions, the cases will be analyzed 
according to the encoding/decoding scheme provided by Stuart Hall in his 1973 iconic 
article “Encoding and Decoding in the Television Discourse,” which goes as follows: 
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An approach of Stuart Hall signifying the encoding and decoding processes was chosen as 
the main prism for approaching the cases. However, the lack of the focus on the emotional 
aspect of encoding/decoding process, which also can be considered crucial at both stages to 
make the image ‘matter,’ the following thesis also seeks to bringing out the use of emotions 
in the communicator-receiver relationship. The research then goes on as follows. Firstly, the 
case representing the leading political discourse will be observed at the stage of encoding, 
which will result dominant encoded narratives and emotions brought out. Then, following 
Hall’s model, the reaction of the audience on the leading political discourse’s representation 
will be observed, which will result in determining if the same narratives and emotions were 
embraced by the people. Then the same is done with the representation of the leading media 
discourse. 
In both cases, the encoding stage involves analyzing the products themselves, the use of 
language, language structures, narrative ideologies etc. In search of the main narratives 
used, this thesis will highlight the ones used more than once in narration. If the language 
structure is used many times and has a crucial importance for the overall message of the 
representation, it will be considered a narrative. Additionally, the emotional part of the 
encoding processes will be analyzed. Since it is extremely hard to operationalize emotions, 
mainly very emotional language structures and raw strong moral emotions highlighted by 
James M. Jasper (2006: 15) will be considered the use of emotions. As highlighted by Hall 
(1973) himself, analyzing encoding is in many ways difficult, because researcher cannot 
ideally mimic the coded messages, but rather is interpreting, thus decoding them him/ 
herself. Therefore, just like in Hall’s approach, more stress should be put on the decoding 
process by the audience. 
In order to analyze decoding, several resources are going to be used. In decoding 
representation of the political discourse, public’s responses in blogs, comments in the media 
resources and Youtube comments will be used. Because of the fact that the documentary 
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film received more responses, social media such as Twitter tweets with #КрымПутьДомой 
and #КрымПутьНаРодину, and Facebook responses in the community Крым. Путь на 
Родину will be added to the set of analyzed decodings of the annexation. Similarly to the 
analysis of the encodings, the language, decoded ideologies and emotions will be observed. 
Also, it will be identified if audience decoded messages in dominant-hegemonic, negotiated 
or the oppositional way, allowing to make better conclusions about the success of encoding. 
The thesis seeks at finding a right balance between the different sources of the decodings. 
Three main categories can generally be referred to as social media, news articles, and blogs. 
From then on, just the existing responses were used, which means that there was no aim at 
getting a very certain amount of responses by the people. Therefore, the amount of 
responses varies. Social media-wise it is important to note that Youtube comments were 
forbidden for the documentary, and similarly, Twitter and Facebook responses to the speech 
were either irrelevant or non-existent. The total amount of comments analyzed in social 
media was therefore 53 in case of political discourse and 113 in case of media discourse. 
News articles were equally responsive comment-wise in both cases and if it was possible, 
this thesis aimed at seeking people’s feedback on more liberal press as well. 95 responses 
concerning political and 53 responses concerning media discourse in news articles were 
analyzed. Since not that many blogs were highlighting the two cases representing political 
and media discourse, the ones who had these discussions were analyzed, once again not 
aiming at getting a particular number of responses. It resulted the analysis of 87 political 
discourse responses and 142 media discourse responses in the blogosphere. In total, 235 
responses to political discourse and 308 responses to media discourse were analyzed, 
despite the initial bigger number of the actual comments that were either deleted, 
inappropriate, or irrelevant. 
Still, one should take into consideration that although focusing on two single cases provides 
the opportunity to obtain a necessary level of detailed knowledge, two cases highlight the 
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developments in only those contextual environments - that is a leading political discourse 
of the current authorities and a media discourse actively produced by the Russia 1 (Россия 
1) TV channel. The same goes for the decoding stage of the research. One possible 
constraint of the thesis is also the fact that only existing data (comments) was analyzed. 
Naturally it is not possible to determine who commented and how many times. Also, 
usually only people interested in this topic would go to blogs or comment under news 
article, which somewhat limits the explanatory power of the paper. 
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5. Encoding/decoding of the Leading Political Discourse: Crimean Speech 
of Vladimir Putin 
The subsequent chapter is an application of the Stuart Hall’s encoding/decoding model to 
the case of Crimean annexation. In addition to revealing the encoded narratives of the 
annexation and analyzing decoding positions taken by the audience, this chapter will also 
introduce the encoded/decoded emotions in the speech. Showing which narratives were 
more thoroughly injected with emotional components will allow to indicate if these 
narratives were also more popular in the decoding process. 
 5.1. Encoding the narratives of the leading political discourse 
The referendum on the status of Crimea was held despite the opposition from Kiev on 
March 16 2014. Official, although questionable results, reported about 95% of participating 
voters in Crimea and Sevastopol were in favor of joining Russia. The next day, the Supreme 
Council of Crimea declared the formal independence of the Republic of Crimea, which 
Parliament almost immediately requested the admittance of the breakaway republic into 
Russia. Russian president Vladimir Putin officially recognized the Republic of Crimea by 
decree and approved the admission of Crimea and Sevastopol as federal subjects of Russia. 
On March 18, a historic speech was performed by Putin in front of the State Duma 
deputies, Federation Council members, heads of Russian regions and civil society 
representatives in the Kremlin. 
The speech has a monumental set of narratives encoded in it, varying from explaining the 
reasons of Crimean annexation to a greater vision of Russian identity. Clearly targeting a 
bigger audience, than just the one Vladimir Putin was performing to at that moment, the 
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speech can be considered a mirror image of what leading Russian political discourse was at 
that moment. 
Firstly, the speech is eager to present Crimea as an organic part of Russia, having a 
tremendous importance for Russia culturally, linguistically, and politically. Putin (2014) 
simply proclaims, “In people’s hearts and minds, Crimea has always been an inseparable 
part of Russia.” The following claim is thereafter supported by several historical examples 
that claim an organic unity of Crimea with Russia. such as, “Everything in Crimea speaks 
for our shared history and pride. /…/ it is enough to know the history of Crimea and what 
Russia and Crimea have always meant for each other,” referring to Crimea as “our 
backyard and historic area” etc. (Putin 2014). 
Naturally, an organic unity is constructed via common history, religion, ethnicity, culture, 
and language. Putin (2014) refers to Crimea as “/…/ the location of ancient Khersones, 
where Prince Vladimir was baptized.” A sudden turn to common Christian heritage is made, 
noting that “Orthodoxy predetermined the overall basis of the culture, civilization and 
human values /…/“ (Putin 2014). Crimea is referred to be “similar to Russia as a whole,” 
because of it’s multinational population. Of course, Putin (2014) does not fail to mention 
the majority of them being Russian and even the existing Ukrainian population 
“considering Russian their native language.” 
In fact, Crimea belonging to Ukraine is seen by Putin as a rather unfortunate historical 
development that is almost an accident. Crimea “/…/ being handed over like a sack of 
potatoes,” resulted to the fact that “/…/ the historical South of Russia ended up in the 
Republic of Ukraine” (Putin 2014). From this, one thing is clear, Crimea was never 
Ukrainian, it was always Russian. 
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Bravely cutting off Crimea from Ukraine goes very well along with demonizing Ukrainian 
leaders and politics that can be considered the second major narrative detectable in the 
speech. Putin (2014) does not hold himself back describing organizers of the Ukrainian 
government takeover as “neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites.” Using World War II 
rhetorics, Putin claims new Ukrainian ideologies being solely connected to Bandera, who 
was Hitler’s accomplice during WW II. Accusations culminate in a strong proclamation 
Putin (2014) makes about Ukrainian authorities, saying, “Time and time again attempts 
were made to deprive Russians of their historical memory, even of their language and to 
subject them to forced assimilation.” 
This wonderful narration also contains a strong reference to the nostalgia over Soviet times. 
Putin (2014) regretfully states that, “/…/ it was impossible to imagine that Ukraine and 
Russia may split up and become two separate states. However, this has happened.” Even 
more, Putin (2014) finds that dissolution of the Soviet Union should have never happened, 
but impossible became a reality. His nostalgic moods almost create a geopolitical epiphany, 
indicating that, “After the dissolution of bipolarity on the planet, we no longer have 
stability.” 
Putin does not forget to mention the ultimate right of the Crimean people to determine their 
own faith. Pleading for the American and European audiences, Putin (2014) makes a 
reference to the Declaration of Independence, unification of East and West Germany, and 
United Nations Charter. He tops it with a thick layer of metaphorical addresses, such as, 
“Isn’t the desire of Crimea’s residents to freely choose their fate such a value?” referring to 
the freedom-connected values of American people. 
Despite wonderful metaphorical language structures, Putin is being shockingly open about 
who there is to blame for the annexation, and surprisingly it is once again the West and the 
United States in particular. A couple of anticipated, but still brilliant references are made 
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towards the Kosovo precedent, intervention in Libya, Arab Spring etc. Blaming the West 
for tremendous amount of human casualties in Kosovo, Putin (2014) reminds his audience 
that, “Our western partners, led by the United States of America, prefer not to be guided by 
international law in their practical policies, but by the rule of the gun.” Western barbarism 
is clearly opposed to an alternative and special ‘Russian way.’ 
Contrary to irresponsible behavior of the West, Russian actions in Crimea are presented by 
Putin (2014) as extremely deliberate, stating that, “There was not a single armed 
confrontation in Crimea and no casualties.” Russia being diplomatically correct is 
supported by Putin’s claim that, “Russia’s Armed Forces never entered Crimea; they were 
there already in line with an international agreement.” It is a clear attempt of the Russian 
leader to oppose Russia to the Western countries. This narrative is brilliantly summed up by 
yet another metaphorical claim of Putin (2014), “I cannot recall a single case in history of 
an intervention without a single shot being fired and with no human casualties.” 
Also, the set of narrations of the Crimean annexation involves a deeper understanding of 
Russian status struggle in the world politics. In his speech, Putin (2014) several times refers 
to a struggle of his country to be taken seriously in global affairs and a strong need to 
defend Russia’s national interests. “/…/ they (the West) have lied to us many times, made 
decisions behind our backs, placed us before an accomplished fact,” argues Putin (2014). 
This unjust feeling of being left out has therefore culminated with Russia saying its decisive 
word in Crimea and finally doing what it had to do all along - protect its interests. 
Paradoxically, Putin (2014) almost threatens international community with “Russia 
snapping back hard, if needed,” “Russia always defending the interests of Russian-speaking 
people using political, diplomatic and legal means,” and “Russia responding to 
irresponsible and aggressive statements accordingly.” The speech almost shouts that Russia 
is back, and not only in Crimea, but on the international arena. 
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Last, but not least, Putin tries really hard to present the whole annexation of Crimea as 
legitimate in the eyes of Russian public, stressing a unanimity of the Russian society on the 
decision to annex Crimea. Putin (2014) emphasizes, that, “Russia’s foreign policy position 
on this matter drew its firmness from the will of millions of our people, our national unity 
and the support of our country’s main political and public forces.” Stating that “/…/ the 
absolute majority of our people clearly do support what is happening,” Putin brilliantly 
makes the whole annexation look like the ultimate will of his nation, rather than his regime. 
Strangely, people are being sold something they actually did themselves. 
Shortly put, the following list of narratives can be deducted from this brilliant speech, 
constituting a meaningful leading Russian political discourse towards Crimean annexation: 
1. Crimea always being an unquestionable part of Russia; 
2. Demonizing Ukrainian authorities; 
3. Nostalgia over Soviet times; 
4. The right of self-determination of Crimean people; 
5. Defining rivalry with the West; 
6. Presenting the Russian way as diplomatic and non-military; 
7. Struggle over Russian status in global affairs; 
8. Annexation is legitimized by the Russian public. 
 5.2. Encoding the emotions of the leading political discourse 
Vladimir Putin’s speech is significant not only because of the multitude of encoded 
narratives, but also because the speech is full of something that deeply appeals to the 
Russian audience - it’s full of emotions. It allowed the messages to sound even more 
powerfully.  
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There are several cases of very personal addresses made by Putin. Targeting specific 
audiences leaves an incredibly personal feeling, such as Putin (2014) referring to the 
American people who “hold freedom above all else” or thanking Chinese people for “taking 
into account the full historical and political context.” Putin also very personally addresses 
the audience as either friends, colleagues or some other emotional way. Especially 
ironically appealing is meant a phrase describing possible NATO forces in Crimea, “Of 
corse most of them are wonderful guys, but it would be better to have them come and visit 
us, be our guests, rather than the other way around.” 
These addresses are strengthened very emotional metaphors used by the Russian leader. His 
reference to Crimea as “the sack of potatoes” being handed from Russia to Ukraine 
certainly calls for the feeling of injustice. The same goes for the metaphor of Ukrainian 
public being “milked” by their authorities or Russian soldiers “avoiding smearing their 
uniforms in blood” during the annexation. 
Of course there are several wordings that are aimed at addressing a very certain type of 
emotional reactions. For example, there are plenty of references to a glorious history, 
patriotism and pride. After naming several Crimean sights, Putin (2014) says about them, 
“Each one of these places is dear to our hearts, symbolizing Russian military glory and 
outstanding valor.” Trying to confirm his point about Crimea being inseparable part of 
Russia, Putin (2014) is sure that this assumption is “/…/ based on truth and justice and was 
passed from generations to generations /…/“. Especially patriotic feelings towards Crimea 
are expressed in the notion of the graves of Russian soldiers being in Crimea. 
Other than historical references, the rest of the speech plays significantly with the ‘fifty 
shades of anger’ and other negative emotions. After Crimea ending up with Ukraine after 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Russia felt “not only robbed, but plundered.” 
According to Putin (2014) Crimea as a part of Ukraine was “outrageous historical 
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injustice.” Of course, when Crimean people asked help from the big Russian brother, “we 
could not leave the plea unheeded” since it simply would have been a betrayal. That kind of 
language is far from coincidental. 
The serious feeling of injustice, exclusion and victimization is also visible in Putin’s way of 
describing West’s attitude towards Russia and her actions. Putin claims the West to have 
lied to Russia and making decisions behind her back. Russian president also angrily snaps 
back at the Western countries for the violations of international law, “They say we are 
violating norms of international law. Firstly, it’s a good thing that they at least remember 
that there exists such thing as international law - better late than never.” 
Inevitably, some narratives of annexation are more strongly injected with the emotions than 
others, which may result to their bigger appeal to the audience. Strong moral emotions such 
as pride and patriotism are clearly evident in the ‘Crimea always being an unquestionable 
part of Russia’ narrative, and the feelings of justice and solidarity can co-exist with the nar-
rative ‘The right of self-determination of Crimean people.’ Other narratives are closely 
connected to the negative emotions of injustice, exclusion and anger, such as ‘Demonizing 
Ukrainian authorities,’ ‘Defining rivalry with the West,’ ‘Struggle over Russian status in 
global affairs’  and ‘Nostalgia over Soviet times.’ Although other narratives can also be as-
sociated with emotions, they are definitely not as strong as the moral emotions and there-
fore are expected to have less emotional appeal in the stage of decoding by the audience. 
 5.3. Decoding the narratives and emotions of the leading political discourse 
The speech of Vladimir Putin got a tremendous amount of feedback from various audiences 
and it was a starting point of a bigger discussion about the re-shaping of Russian identity 
and Russian foreign policy discourse in general. Despite the audience being the whole 
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world, the emotional speech was undoubtedly targeting the Russian society, wanting to 
create the legitimacy of the annexation in the eyes of the Russian public. 
In order to analyze how well did Putin’s address worked on the Russian people, several 
resources of the existing reactions should be studied. To understand the position of the 
audience, comments directly on Youtube under the official video of the speech, comments 
of the news articles concerning the speech, and comments in a blog will be taken as the 
main resources for the stage of decoding. According to the encoding/decoding model, a 
dominant position in the decoding process can be detected. On top of that, specifically 
which narratives were the most popular will also be brought out. If the narratives are the 
ones containing strong emotions, their use by Vladimir Putin will be considered a 
successful use of emotions. 
Firstly, decoding process should focus on the comments section of the Youtube video 
(Крымская речь - 2-я Историческая речь Владимира Путина 2014) of the speech. Out 
of the existing 57 comments, 4 are shown empty, leaving only 53 comments to analyze. Out 
of the 53 feedbacks on the video, 45 were interpreted from the dominant-hegemonic 
position, 4 from negotiated and 4 from oppositional position. Interestingly, the general 
trend of both positive and negative responses focus on the persona of Mr. Putin. Comments 
of the users vary from “Putin is the man, I am proud of him!,” “This is our president, well 
done!” and “This man is not lying and he means what he says!” to “Putin is an aggressor, 
occupant and fascist!” and “I am for Russia, therefore naturally against Putin.” Those users 
interpreting the speech in negotiated manner agree with the presented ideology, but add 
interesting details such as “Kazakhstan should be next. There are so many Russian 
territories in there and it is simply not fair /…/” or “Belarus should be Russian as well!” 
There are several narratives that were purely embraced by the public. Among them is a 
narrative ‘Crimea always being an unquestionable part of Russia’ with comments such as 
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“Crimea is Russian! It’s forever!” or “Crimea is back in Russia.” Some users clearly feel 
nostalgic about the Soviet times with “We give you ex-Soviet Union!” or embrace the West 
as being the biggest rival of Russia with a comment such as, “/…/ he is the only president 
who holds his head high in the relations with the US and the EU. I suggest we support this 
head of state!” Many of the users embracing the dominant-hegemonic interpretation are 
being extremely emotional, stressing the historical importance of the speech and 
patriotically announcing “I am Russian and proud of it!” or “Hurray, I live in Russia! /…/ I 
am proud of my country and nation!” 
Equally interesting are public’s responses in different Russian media resources such as 
reactions in the comments sections of different newspapers highlighting the news about the 
speech. Among them are comments under the article named ‘The triumph of the soft power’ 
in an online business newspaper Взгляд (The View). The article (Триумф «мягкой силы» 
2014) itself takes on rather dominant-hegemonic position, highlighting the importance of 
the speech in geopolitical terms, protecting Russia’s interests in international politics etc. 
Despite a rather modest amount of content-rich comments, only 10 out of 20 comments 
actually discuss the speech, all the comments on the topic take on a similar position to the 
one in the article and the one presented by the original speech. 
Predominantly, people believe the annexation of Crimea being a historical moment for 
Russia, supported by the comments such as “/…/ This is a historically crucial moment that 
is going to be remembered for centuries. It is a reunification of Russia! /…/” or “The world 
will never be the same after the return of Crimea and Putin’s speech. It is the beginning of a 
multipolar world in which Russia is one of the poles /…/.“ Audience also feel quite patriotic 
and proud about the annexation, stressing that, “/…/ I have not been so proud about my 
country for decades! /…/“ or “/…/ People are crying from happiness! Finally, we can be 
proud of our country! /…/“ Among strong positive moral emotions, there is also a sense of 
loss, anger and injustice for dissolution of the Soviet Union and losing Crimea in the first 
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place, articulated as “People were betrayed and disoriented. We voted for the Soviet Union 
to stay, but we were fooled! /…/“ or “/…/ We have to understand that this is no time to be 
weak. Russia was once on her knees, choking from the tears when the Soviet Union was 
dissolved. This cannot happen again! /…/“ Arguments of the audience are indeed extremely 
emotional. 
A hugely popular daily newspaper Московский комсомолец (Moscow Komsomolets) was 
covering a story about the reactions of the political elite, who witnessed Putin perform the 
speech with an article ‘Putin’s Crimean address: what was going on in the halls and 
hallways of Kremlin?’ The article (Обращение Путина по Крыму: что творилось в зале 
и коридорах Кремля 2014) had quite a few interesting comments that reflected the way 
people interpreted the speech and its message. Out of 76 comments, 27 were off the topic or 
impossible to interpret the audience position from. Out of the rest 49 comments, only 2 can 
be considered an expression of oppositional way of decoding the speech. The rest of the 
reactions are the reflection of audience embracing the dominant-hegemonic way of 
interpretation. 
The most popular decoded narrative was once again ‘Crimea always being an 
unquestionable part of Russia’ with comments such as, “The fact that Crimeans decided to 
reunite with Russia is great, we are one,” “I am happy and proud to have an opportunity to 
welcome Crimea back home. Welcome back brothers. Go Russia!” or “Welcome home. We 
always were and we will always be one nation!” There are several other deeply emotional 
comments about being proud of being Russian, being proud of the president, Russians 
never giving up, and finally being united as one nationality. Some reactions are directly 
focused on negatively describing the Western countries as Russia’s main rivals, such as in 
comments, “/…/ London and Washington have always had plans against Russia. /…/ The 
ones who believe that America and Europe should dictate what to do to Russia, do not 
belong here /…/“ or “Now we hear threats. We shouldn’t be worried though, NATO does 
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not want to bury its soldiers in Russian soil.” Emotions in the comments rise up and down, 
ranging from euphoric to angry, proud and happy to being misunderstood and excluded. 
Similar comments are also visible at Russia’s leading liberal business broadsheet, 
Коммерсантъ (The Businessman) web-page under the timeline (Владимир Путин 
подписал договор о вхождении Крыма в состав России 2014) of the March 18, 2014 
events. Among 36 comments, two main narratives of dominant-hegemonic position 
prevalent: ‘Crimea always being an unquestionable part of Russia’ and ‘Defining rivalry 
with the West.’ The first narrative is supported by the comments such as, “Why do we even 
need to do so much explaining? It is simply enough to say that we amended a historical 
injustice made 54 years ago and that’s the key here,” “Today, 21st century started for 
Russia! Now everything is going to change! We now live in a different country and I hope it 
will all get better!” and “What a happy reunification. Congratulations, everyone!” The 
second narrative has been expressed by the audience with comments like, “All the sanctions 
and filth from the Western democracies are going to look like they are punishing Russia for 
helping our brothers!” and “Sanctions against Russia are basically telling us that we 
shouldn’t use the methods of the United States, that it is only their privilege.” Despite many 
positions supporting dominant-hegemonic interpretation of the speech, the readers of the 
following paper also express more oppositional positions with comments such as, “It will 
not get any better or different. Russia is a swamp and it will continue being it!” or “This is 
all one big joke. Let’s see what is going to be a reaction of the civilized world.” 
Finally, a blog of Kristina Potupchik, a member of the Civic Chamber of the Russian 
Federation will be taken as an example of decoding of the speech in so to say the 
blogosphere environment. Miss Potupchik’s blog is available at the Radio Echo of Moscow 
webpage and the reactions to her post named Крымская речь Владимира Путина (2014) 
were observed for decodings. The short post itself completely takes on a dominant- 
hegemonic narration of the Crimean annexation, using narratives such as ‘Crimea always 
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being an unquestionable part of Russia,’ ‘Demonizing Ukrainian authorities,’ ‘Presenting 
the Russian way as diplomatic and non-military,’ and ‘Struggle over Russian status in 
global affairs’ at the stage of decoding. 
However, the blog of Kristina Potupchik stands out by receiving a big amount of interesting 
feedback from the Russian public, a total of 232 responses and comments. Stunningly, 
comments in the blog were almost completely opposite from all the results mentioned 
above. Firstly, it is important to highlight that 78 comments were marked as “hidden” and 
therefore their essence could not have been analyzed. About 67 comments were either 
inappropriate, blaming the blogger for complete incompetence, repetitions of thoughts by 
the same commentators, or simply being off the topic. Out of the remaining 87 comments to 
analyze, 71 took an oppositional position of decoding of the speech, which means that only 
16 comments actually supported dominant-hegemonic way of interpretation of Putin’s 
address. 
These striking results also revealed a continuation of the trend in supportive comments of 
the speech to use emotional narratives. Those interpreting the speech in dominant- 
hegemonic way mirrored narratives such as ‘Presenting the Russian way as diplomatic and 
non-military’ with, “/…/ Russia did her own Maidan in Crimea, but without any smoke or 
blood,” narrative ‘Defining rivalry with the West’ with, “European Union, Merkel and 
Obama need a reality check. They are completely inadequate,” or narrative ‘Crimea always 
being an unquestionable part of Russia with, “Crimean people are crying from happiness. 
Welcome back home!” Mostly, the ones supporting the message of the speech simply 
approve the annexation, but sometimes also mention the narrative ‘Annexation is 
legitimized by the Russian public’ with comments like, “Putin indeed did everything 
correctly. He has the support of Crimean and Russian people.” 
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As for the oppositional way of interpreting, which in the case of this blog environment 
seems to be dominant, comments seem to oppose the narratives of the speech such as 
‘Presenting the Russian way as diplomatic and non-military’ with comments such as, “What 
does it even mean that the annexation was completely peaceful and without causing any 
pain? Crimean people will feel the pain fully after being under Putin’s rule” or “There 
wasn’t any blood because of Ukrainian forces being smart about it, not Russia being 
peaceful. Our soldiers were ready to rip everyone apart.” Some commentators find the 
annexation to be really inappropriate, saying, “This is a Soviet-imperialist triumph. I am 
simply disgusted!” or, “Crimea was taken over really meanly by the people without any 
identification. They were the puppets of the Kremlin thieves.” Many people taking the 
oppositional standpoint look more thoroughly into the consequences of the annexation, 
commenting, “I am afraid that Putin is not going to pay for his speech himself, but it will 
all be done by simple Russian people,” or, “The only “merit” of Putin’s words is that 
Russian and Ukrainian people will hate each other for a very long time now.” It almost 
seems that the following audience was more mature decoding the entered narratives, 
messages and emotions. One of the users sums the speech up with his comment, “This is a 
nasty lie of Putin! This is all filthy and false, and is meant for the dumb audience! /…/” 
All in all, several interesting conclusions can be made about the decoding process of the 
Putin’s so-called Crimean speech. Dominant-hegemonic position of interpretation can be 
considered more preferable by the public, although results show that it can vary 
significantly based on the feedback platform. Embracing the dominant-hegemonic position 
also often means embracing different narrations of annexation, most frequently the ones 
with strong moral emotions injected in them. The negotiated position was not taken by 
many commentators, although in some cases they show an interesting way of the speech 
interpretation. Finally, although the oppositional interpretation was not as common, it also 
revealed several crucial ways of understanding encoded messages. 
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6. Encoding/decoding of the Leading Media Discourse: “Crimea: The 
Road Back Home” documentary film by Andrey Kondrashov 
This chapter is also an application of the Stuart Hall’s encoding/decoding model to the case 
of narration of Crimean annexation. Similarly to the previous case, the analysis of the 
documentary will reveal the encoded narratives of annexation and decoding positions taken 
by the audience. The encoded/decoded emotions in the documentary will also be 
highlighted. Once again, showing which narratives were more thoroughly injected with 
emotional components will make it possible to indicate if these narratives were also more 
often embraced by the audience in the decoding process. 
 6.1. Encoding the narratives of the leading media discourse 
Because of the specificity of the documentary films and motion pictures in general, the 
amount of material to analyze was significantly bigger and therefore more complicated. In 
the analysis of the images, such as this piece by Kondrashov, not only what is being shown 
matters, but also what is being said, the overall format of the production and so on. 
Surprisingly, despite a dramatic increase of the material to analyze, the narration of the 
story in this media discourse did not significantly differ from the speech case of the leading 
political discourse. 
What is pretty clear though, is that techniques used to convince the audience to believe 
what is seen on the screen has become much more advanced. The structure of the movie 
reminds a timeline of the annexation process and the narration starts from the February 
events in Maidan, it specifically focuses on the figure of Ukrainian ex-president 
Yanukovich and his escape from Kiev. From then on, events in Crimea are focused on one 
by one, leading to the referendum on independence and consequently to Crimea “reuniting” 
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with Russia. In between the stories and personal interviews with the actual participants in 
the events, president Putin is being interviewed, sharing his opinion on the developments, 
Russian position, his personal contribution to the ‘Crimean Spring,’ and so on. 
Overall set of narratives used by Kondrashov practically coincides with Putin’s speech and 
leading political discourse’s position concerning the Crimean events, but adding visual 
content, personal stories and a great director’s work, narratives start blooming way more. 
Although the speech itself had some raw emotions encoded in it, the narration in the 
documentary seems soaked with emotions, leaving audiences proud of their country and 
president, angry on the monstrous nationalists from Kiev and excluded by manipulative 
Western democracies. Everything is explained in such colorful detail, that narratives start 
going beyond their own borders. 
Perhaps one narrative, which was strongly used in the speech was not as evident in the 
documentary, it is the ‘Nostalgia over Soviet times’ narrative. Only once, the past Soviet 
times played a significant part of the narration. The head of the Crimean Republic, Sergey 
Aksyonov explained that Simferopol, the capital of Crimea, was claimed to be the nest of 
the enemies by Kiev. Kiev demanded the statue of Lenin be removed from the main square 
of the city. The statue of Lenin was where people gathered to protest and therefore 
Aksyonov explains, “We were ready to defend the statue, it was a symbol of stability for us” 
(Kondrashov 2015). This means that the following narrative was not taken as one of the 
basics in narrating the annexation by the leading media discourse. 
However, one new narrative was added by the leading media discourse focusing on the 
legality of Russian actions in Crimea. Firstly, it is several times confirmed by the actions 
concerning helping Yanukovich. The narration explains that Yanokovich had solutions to 
existing problems in Ukraine, but instead, the protesters in Maidan took over the 
government and against the constitution, forced a legitimate president to withdraw from his 
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position. The same goes for Russian military being present in the Parliament of Crimea in 
order for the legitimate deputies to feel safe in their working environment (Kondrashov 
2015). By helping legitimate Ukrainian and Crimean authorities, Russia tries to seemingly 
legalize the intervention. It is all topped with Putin’s opinion that, “Russia did not violate 
any international agreements concerning the amount of soldiers in Crimea. We never 
exceeded the amount of military presence previously agreed upon with Ukraine” (Kon-
drashov 2015). The new narrative can thus be named ‘Legality of the Russian actions in 
Crimea.’  
There is also a slight change in narrative ‘Annexation is legitimized by the Russian public’ 
because of one important addition to the following narrative. As explained several times by 
Putin and the narrator, the legitimization primarily came from all the people of Crimea, 
even more, they demanded Crimea come back to Russia. Putting it almost in the form of 
necessity, legitimization is taken to a whole new level, it becomes a matter of life or death.  
Here, problematic Crimean Tatars are actively used as one of the ways showing an extreme 
need to annex Crimea, legitimized by all of the nations of Crimea. As narration goes on, it 
is explained that Ukrainian authorities threatened Tatars of new deportations, if Crimea 
becomes a part of Russia. Some of their leaders tried convincing people that their situation 
in Russia is not going to get worse, because it cannot possibly be worse than it already is. 
“We have not seen any good from Ukraine over these years,” says one of the leaders of 
Crimean Tatars. “We are being manipulated and used as a tool by Kiev!” claims one of the 
women from Mamut-Sultan Tatar village (Kondrashov 2015). this is all supported by strong 
images of Tatars living in poverty, without drinking water, electricity and, often without 
shelter. Because of such a strong part of different nationalities of Crimea legitimizing the 
annexation, it would be wise to slightly change the name of this narrative to ‘Annexation is 
legitimized by the Russian public and demanded by all of the Crimean nations.’ 
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In that case, the Russian public legitimizing the annexation is still strongly supported by the 
documentary. Images of hundreds of thousands of people in Moscow marching in support 
of Crimean decision to join Russia are supported with striking numbers of polls. Russian 
people were questioned and showed that the overwhelming support for the Crimean 
reunification with Russia was given by the public. Percentage of people supporting 
Crimean annexation never dropped below 80%, leaving the audience with a clear 
understanding that Russian authorities’ actions in Crimea were a strongly supported by the 
Russian people. 
No striking changes were indicated in the use of narrative ‘Struggle over Russian status in 
global affairs.’ Although this narrative is hardly supported by the visual content, it is 
strongly brought in by Vladimir Putin. As explained by narrator, although there was a 
consensus  over Russian actions in both Crimea and Russia, the opposition was only fierce 
in Brussels and Washington. “Western countries tried to stop the reunification in every 
possible way. Most probably, it was yet another attempt to shut Russia down and fulfill their 
own interests. I will be honest with you, ignoring Russia is not possible anymore,” states 
Putin. He adds that, “None of this would have happened if I did not know that I am acting 
on the behalf of the interests of the Russian people and our whole country. It does not mean 
that we should not take into consideration the interests of our partners. It simply means that 
our partners as well have to accept and honor the interests of Russia” (Kondrashov 2015). 
Although the following narrative is not mentioned as obviously anywhere else in the movie, 
it is also extremely evident in connection with the rivalry with the West. 
The use of the narrative ‘The right of self-determination of Crimean people’ surely shifts 
closer to the narrative connected to all the Crimean nations demanding stronger Russian 
presence in Crimea, but still stands out as a separate narrative, with plenty of visual and 
textual material to prove its strong presence in the leading media discourse. Even before the 
official title of the movie, Putin proclaims that, “We needed to give people a chance to 
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determine their own faith and express their opinion” (Kondrashov 2015). Similar rhetoric 
goes on in several other stories told in the documentary, such as Crimeans voluntarily 
forming resistance units, constantly protesting against Ukrainian authorities and expressing 
their pro-Russian views in every possible manner. Putin cannot withhold mentioning that, 
“The local resistance played a crucial role in all of this. It was their own choice and all of 
our decisions were based on the will of the Crimean people.” The head of the Crimean 
Republic, Sergey Aksyonov once again expresses his opinion, saying that “People were 
standing in line to vote for the reunification with Russia. An absolute record in terms of 
appearance was registered. People made their decision” (Kondrashov 2015). Although this 
time no references to any precedents such as Kosovo were made, every frame of regular 
people waving Russian flags or voting in the referendum seeks to show that people had the 
right to voice their opinion and determine their own faith. 
Any significant changes in the use of the narrative ‘Presenting the Russian way as 
diplomatic and non-military’ were not detected, although in the documentary this narrative 
was very strongly supported by the visual representations. A new term, “polite people,” 
referring to Russian soldiers in green uniforms was introduced in the documentary. They 
were there to assure the safety of deputies and their families, narration explains. The term 
“polite people” was created by the Crimean people themselves. Interviewees mention that 
these people were extremely polite, neat and friendly, and that they came there to protect, 
not to invade. This is supported by a set of imagery of Crimean children hugging the 
soldiers and taking pictures with them. There is also another interesting way of portraying 
this narrative. Although Russian military commanders suggested Putin to demonstrate full 
force of the Russian military to protect their national interests in Crimea, Putin refused, 
saying that, “The Cold War is over and there is no need for yet another international crisis, 
similar to Cuban” (Kondrashov 2015). According to narration and images, in order to avoid 
violence, Russian authorities and Crimean public convinced Ukrainian military to switch 
sides instead of fighting. In his post scriptum interview, Putin admits that, “We supported 
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this bloodless referendum and I am pretty sure that if we wouldn’t have done that, the events 
in Crimea would have mirrored the events in Donbass, if not been even worse” (Kon-
drashov 2015). 
Although some narratives taken over from the leading political discourse remain relatively 
the same in the documentary, three narratives were absolutely dominantly presented in the 
leading media discourse: ‘Crimea always being an unquestionable part of Russia,’ 
‘Demonizing Ukrainian authorities,’ and ‘Defining rivalry with the West.’ These narratives 
were expanded, masterfully visualized and have become almost overwhelmingly dominant. 
The set of textual and visual representations for these narratives exceed all the other 
representations of narratives combined.  
Firstly, what has visually been done with demonizing Ukrainian authorities goes beyond 
any description. Even before the official title, Putin manages to proclaim that, “We are 
obliged to start working on the return of Crimea to Russia, because we cannot abandon this 
territory and its people under the steamroller of nationalists” (Kondrashov 2015). The 
following rhetoric of presenting Ukrainian authorities after Yanukovich as nationalist goes 
on throughout the whole film. After an attack on the van of Crimean protesters, an 
interview is conducted with a man who has been hurt in this attack in the remnants of this 
van. As explained in narration, nationalists started to attack the most unprotected people 
and chasing the peaceful anti-Maidan protesters from Crimea with dogs. Images of brutal 
shootings, attacks, and nationalists forcing people to eat the shattered glass are shown. The 
man explains that, “They were pouring all of their hatred on us, despite the fact that we 
haven’t done anything to them,” adding that, “We understood that we cannot be a part of 
Ukraine any more. They are fascists and nationalists” (Kondrashov 2015). Putin himself 
concludes that, “Only after the colossal explosion of the nationalistic moods we understood 
that we cannot abandon these people” (Kondrashov 2015). What has been described above 
is only the tip of the iceberg. 
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Demonization goes on with denying that the new authorities in Kiev were legitimized by 
the Ukrainian people. Putin is eager to mention that there was actually no-one to talk to in 
Kiev any more, simply because, “I have to admit that Ukrainian soldiers who changed the 
sides were very brave. They were loyal to their state, when there actually wasn’t any state 
per se. All the orders were given by the people who simply illegitimately seized the state 
power” (Kondrashov 2015). All of the textual arguments are supported by the visual images 
of chaos in Maidan, shootings, and murders in Donbass. 
Portraying new Ukrainian authorities as no less than complete monsters is also evident. 
Putin suggests that Ukrainian authorities have always planned the execution of the Crimean 
people, saying that, “Looking at the disproportionate number of military vis-à-vis civilians 
in the peninsula, it seems like Ukraine always wanted to start a war in Crimea. In order to 
give people a right to voice their opinions, we had to avoid the massacre and stop 
Ukrainian army and police from shutting down people’s opinion” (Kondrashov 2015). On 
top of being illegitimate, almost inhuman traits are given to the new authorities in Kiev, 
who presumably were furious about Ukrainian soldiers switching sides and demanded any 
protesters be shot dead if they tried to convince soldiers to change sides. Naturally, the 
murderous orders by Kiev never made it to Crimea because of the Russian efforts. One of 
the commanders of the Crimean resistance tells a story of the Right Sector hit-men trying to 
poison the drinking water for the whole city of Simferopol. “There would have been a huge 
amount of victims,” he says. Demonizing Kiev authorities is escalated showing them 
sending weapons to Crimea in order to organize something similar to Maidan. A story of a 
person who died stopping a truck full of weapons entering Crimea is introduced, with an 
interview of his mother and his wife coming to his grave. 
Compared to the speech, no concealed hints are given about the participation of the West in 
the conflict. On the contrary, everything is said out loud with the detailed description of 
how the West planned to strip the Crimean people of their will to join Russia. One of the 
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organizers of the pro-Russian protests, Vitaly Punko comments on the events in Crimea, 
saying that “Russians and Ukrainians always had brotherly relations, but Americans ruined 
everything, just like everywhere else in the world. It is thanks to Putin that war never 
started here” (Kondrashov 2015). Some extremely brave references towards NATO forces 
and the ‘long hand of Washington’ are made in the narration, such as the existence of a 
military base in Feodosiya, claimed to be a NATO-trained marine base, getting instructions 
directly from the U.S. Consulate General in Kiev ready to act against the civilians, or 
military experts of the United States training Maidan combatants to over-throw the 
legitimate Ukrainian authorities. The ultimate accusation towards the United States is 
concluded in a brilliant quote by Putin, admitting that, “Formally, the opposition in Kiev 
was supported by our European partners, but we know very well that the actual puppeteers 
were our American friends. They were the ones helping prepare the nationalists and 
military units. Our American partners were basically helping organize a coup d’etat in 
Ukraine and were acting from the position of force. It should not be the way to act in an 
international arena” (Kondrashov 2015). 
One of the heavily cited quote by Putin also supports the rivalry with the West. Putin admits 
that, “We couldn’t predict if the Western countries are not going to militarily intervene in 
the Crimean situation. I had to inform our military commanders that we have to be ready 
for different type of scenarios. This also involves mobilizing our nuclear weaponry. As I 
told you before, this is our historical territory, Russian people live there and they were in 
danger. We could not leave them. Western countries can support what was happening in 
Kiev, but this is our land! We were ready for the worst case scenario, but I assumed that it 
is not going to happen” (Kondrashov 2015). The shocking fact that even Russian nuclear 
arsenal was actually mobilized shows a tremendous importance given to Crimea and is 
strongly supported by the last narrative of Crimea being an organic part of Russia. 
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Consequently, a whole new level of tying Crimea to Russia is evident in both visual and 
textual representations of the documentary. A military commander, Viktor Melnikov 
comments on the events in Crimea, saying that “Sevastopol created such an image of 
eternal glory that even the 23 years of occupation…” “And you call it an occupation?” 
clarifies the reporter. “Yes. We were able to bring through our love towards Russia and 
rescue our history” (Kondrashov 2015). The fact that Crimea and Sevastopol in particular 
were never Ukrainian, but always Russian is supported by many other quotes. Putin notes 
that, “If we talk about historical injustice, Sevastopol has always been a city of military and 
maritime glory for Russia, and everything was turned upside down” (Kondrashov 2015). 
Narration tells that there is no other city in the Russian history for which as much blood has 
been shed as for Sevastopol. This is a hero-city, a fortress-city and a city of admirals, which 
even during Soviet times remained under direct jurisdiction of Moscow. Only in Crimea, 
the love for Russia could be radical, narration concludes. 
The fact that Crimea was always Russian is supported by some very metaphorical, almost 
poetic quotes of the interviewees. Putin victoriously proclaims that, “In the mind of Russian 
people, Crimea associates with heroic pages of our history. It goes back to gaining these 
lands and defending them during the World War 2. Crimea is tied to the Russian history, to 
Russian literature and art, and to the Royal family. The whole canvas of the Russian history 
is connected to Crimea” (Kondrashov 2015). Narration claims Crimea not being a random 
territory for Russia, but being a historically Russian land with a predominant Russian 
population. An obligation to study foreign Ukrainian language is supported by the 
statement that there were about 40 laws restricting the use of Russian language in Crimea. 
Still, the people of Crimea were eager to protect their cultural and historical code, teaching 
a real history, which opposed an alien Ukrainian history that glorified Bandera. Finally, one 
of the interviewees admits that, “I am so thankful to Russia that Crimea is back home 
again. The nationalist violence in Crimea would have been way greater than it is in Eastern 
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Ukraine now, because we always considered ourselves a part of Russia” (Kondrashov 
2015). 
In terms of images, everything was done to convince the audiences of Crimea being 
ultimately Russian. A very special role in the documentary is played by the Orthodox 
Church, symbolizing an ultimate organic unity between ‘mother Russia’ and Crimea, with 
churches appearing every now and then in the frames of the film. A lot of images of 
Russian symbols used by the protesters are added to the film, with people waiving Russian 
flags, welcoming Russian soldiers, shouting “Russia, Russia!” during the protests etc. 
Basically, almost every frame seeks to show the audience that Crimea was never an organic 
part of Ukraine, but stressing people secretly hoping that Crimea will be reunited with 
Russia one day. 
Based on the narratives overtaken from the leading political discourse and additions made 
by the leading media discourse, the list of the encoded narratives in the meaningful media 
discourse on the Crimean annexation by Russian Federation goes as follows: 
1. Crimea always being an unquestionable part of Russia; 
2. Demonizing Ukrainian authorities; 
3. Defining rivalry with the West; 
4. The right of self-determination of Crimean people; 
5. Presenting the Russian way as diplomatic and non-military; 
6. Struggle over Russian status in global affairs; 
7. Legality of the Russian actions in Crimea; 
8. Annexation is legitimized by the Russian public and demanded by all of the Crimean 
nations. 
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 6.2. Encoding the emotions of the leading media discourse 
It would not be an exaggeration to say that the leading media discourse managed to encode 
a huge amount of emotional content in the images and interviews of the documentary. 
Similarly to the encoding made by the leading political discourse, media discourse also uses 
a great variety of strong moral emotions to get the messages through, using a much bigger 
advantage of the motion picture format. 
Generally, the whole documentary takes an extremely personal stance, where interviewees 
share their stories and visions of the events in Crimea. It is made hard not to sympathize 
with the word of a Cossack who defended the border of Crimea with Ukraine, saying that, 
“Grannies were on their knees, begging us not to leave” (Kondrashov 2015) or the 
president of the Crimean section of the Night Wolf bikers club, Alexander Medvedev telling 
his story of defending Crimea from nationalists and losing his limb. Medvedev was helping 
the resistance after a surgical operation on the leg, despite the hazards and warnings of the 
doctors. It resulted him losing some more of his limb. He comments that, “There was no 
time for my leg, and actually it wasn’t important. The most important is the fact that Crimea 
is Russian now and that the justice prevailed. Crimea is always going to be Russian from 
now on” (Kondrashov 2015). The sense of personal sacrifice made for a bigger goal is 
screaming right in the audience’ faces. 
Of course, there are a lot of other personal and positive emotional things to share. One of 
the organizers of the pro-Russian protests, Vitaly Punko was interviewed in his own car, 
summing up his interview with showing a back seat of his car with a baby seat and noting 
that, “After all of this mess ended, we decided to have another child. My daughter’s name is 
Polina, although name Victoria would be more suitable” (Kondrashov 2015). Positive 
emotions of justice prevailing, patriotism, glory, heroism, and pride are encoded in other 
visual representations of the film. Portraying Crimean men from the controversial 
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Ukrainian special forces “Berkut” coming home from Kiev is a clear analogy with men 
coming home from war as heroes, although they were broken-down and treated as enemies 
in the whole Ukraine, they were treated as heroes at home. The strong patriotic will of the 
people is enforced by the images of forging shields to protect Crimea from Ukrainian 
nationalists coming by trains to punish the resistance. “We came together to defend our 
land, protect our homes and families,” says one of the member of Crimean resistance. “We 
all came together as one, simple workers, businessmen, blacksmiths and others. People 
were ready to face the death, if needed. People of different nationalities and religions were 
all united under one flag” (Kondrashov 2015). The shields had Crimean tricolors on them, 
symbolizing the unity, strength and unbeatable spirit of the people. The same goes for 
saying that the tops of the churches and minarets co-existed in Crimea for centuries and 
Putin adding that, “We have no intensions hurting Crimean Tatars, local Germans, Greeks, 
Armenians, Russians or Ukrainians. We want the people of Crimea to be one big 
family” (Kondrashov 2015). 
However, the choice of the negative images can simply amaze the audience, resulting to a 
huge amount of negative reactions of the people. Showing bloody footage of killed civilians 
in Maidan, narrating the tortures of the Crimean people conducted by the alleged 
nationalists, and a very graphic picture of a dead young woman and her baby covered in 
blood, a victim from Eastern Ukraine, leave audiences not only angry, but furious. The 
sense of injustice and oppression is brought up again by the obligation to study Ukrainian 
language, even though nobody spoke it in Crimea. Questionable humane morals of the new 
Kiev authorities are addressed via narrating the chasing of the legitimate president of 
Ukraine, Victor Yanukovich, with a clear intention to destroy him. 
Despite the fine balance of the euphoric positive and horrific negative emotions in images 
and lines, once again, some narratives stand out by miles in terms of their emotional 
content. The narrative ‘Crimea always being an unquestionable part of Russia’ suggests a 
  !69
great amount of strong positive moral emotions such as pride and justice being encoded in 
it. To the contrary, the narratives ‘Demonizing Ukrainian authorities’ and ‘Defining rivalry 
with the West’ are injected with a lot of anger, injustice, exclusion and victimization. The 
just feeling in the audience can also be called upon the narratives ‘The right of self- 
determination of Crimean people’ and ‘Annexation is legitimized by the Russian public and 
demanded by all of the Crimean nations.’ The narrative ‘Struggle over Russian status in 
global affairs,’ having some sense of injustice and exclusion encoded in it, can 
consequently be more negatively perceived by the public. 
  
 6.3. Decoding the narratives and emotions of the leading media discourse 
To understand the audience’s standpoint, reactions on the documentary in the social media, 
such as Twitter and Facebook, comments of the news articles concerning the documentary, 
and comments in blogs will be taken as the main resources for the stage of decoding. 
Analysis will determine a dominant position of the audience in the decoding process, bring 
out the most effective narratives embraced by the public, and if the narratives are the ones 
containing strong emotions, their use in the documentary will be considered a successful 
use of emotions. 
The analysis of the decoding process can easily start from the Facebook community Крым. 
Путь на Родину (2015), which is specifically dedicated to the documentary. One of the 
posts simply asks the audience: “What do you think about the movie?” allowing to get clear 
people’s decoding response. Despite a rather modest amount of reactions, 16 users in total, 
it is still possible to conclude that the audience takes on a rather dominant-hegemonic 
position with 11 people liking the movie and recommending it with comments such as, 
“Fantastic events and a great movie,” or “The movie describes everything just the way it 
was!” The rest of the audience takes an oppositional position with comments like, “You can 
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almost give this film an Oscar. So many lies and one-sided interpretations,” or “This film is 
a provocation. You may watch it, but don’t take this delirium seriously.” 
Some narratives encoded in the documentary were also decoded accordingly by the 
audiences. People were rather supportive to the narrative ‘Presenting the Russian way as 
diplomatic and non-military’ with comments such as, “With his actions, Putin avoided the 
events of Eastern Ukraine in Crimea, where these monsters are cutting and killing people” 
or “Putin did everything correctly and saved the people from the war. Unfortunately, people 
in Donbass were not as lucky /…/” One of the commentators supports the rivalry with the 
West with his comment, “/…/ Americans are just cowards, who only bomb and shoot 
civilians /…/.” Some people decoded emotionality of the messages, commenting, “I 
watched it and cried. I am proud to have been born in the USSR,” “How much suffering did 
people have to go through? I did not know this before watching this piece!” or “I am about 
to explode from the feeling of patriotism! I am so proud of my country!” 
In Twitter, the amount of reactions was way bigger than on Facebook, with people using 
hashtags #КрымПутьНаРодину (2015) and #крымпутьдомой (2015) to express their 
opinions about the documentary. Among hundreds of comments celebrating a year after the 
reunification of Crimea with Russia, 97 tweets were specifically focused on the topic of the 
documentary and 83 of them were supportive of the dominant hegemonic way of decoding. 
Among 14 oppositional tweets, some stand out more than the others, such as “The 
inspiration of this film has clearly been taken from the ideological films of the German 
nazis!” or  “How can people cheer about this occupation of the foreign territory? Shame on 
you!”  
The users of the two hashtags were not hiding their patriotic emotions in their tweets, 
praising the president and their country. Generally, the tweets focused on strong positive 
moral emotions. There were also certain narratives that seemed to be more appealing to the 
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audiences, such as narrative ‘Crimea always being an unquestionable part of Russia’ with 
tweets like, “Welcome back home Crimea and Sevastopol!” and “Crimea always was, and it 
will always be Russian!” or narrative ‘Demonizing Ukrainian authorities’ with a tweet like, 
“I am watching the film and I am simply amazed by the brutal actions of these Ukrainian 
bastards.” Some Twitter users were more eager focusing on the narrative ‘Defining rivalry 
with the West’ tweeting, “Crimea is in Russia again. Let the Americans cry in the corner!” 
Similarly to social media, the discussion over the content of the documentary film was also 
visible in regular media channels. Among them was an article in an online business 
newspaper Взгляд (The View). The article (Общественное мнение: «Крым. Путь на 
Родину» 2015) had quite a bit of feedback with 227 comments. This comment section 
stood out being one of the most rich and fruitful discussions. Because the article itself 
presented opinions of academics and other famous Russian people, comments often 
discussed them, leaving only 33 actual opinions on the documentary itself. However, 
despite a small number of decodings, this comment section stood out with 2 negotiated 
positions of the audience, such comments as, “I watched the film and I liked it. Although as 
a citizen of Russian Federation I have to admit that I was disturbed by the fact that our 
forces had to support the referendum. /…/ After all that, it just isn’t believable enough that 
it was a pure choice of the Crimean people /…/” or “The film was not bad, but they could 
stress political realism way more than they did stress patriotic subjectivism. The movie 
could have had a way bigger impact if all the obvious propaganda elements would have 
been replaced with diplomatic language.”  
Despite a way more mature discussion in the comments focusing on the actual elements of 
the film, dominant-hegemonic decoding model still prevailed with 27 responses and only 4 
oppositional positions taken, such as in a comment, “I recommend you have a look at some 
other videos in Youtube explaining why this is clearly a Russian occupation.” In the 
prevailing dominant-hegemonic decoding, several narratives were once again more popular 
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than the others. The narrative ‘Struggle over Russian status in global affairs’ was supported 
by one commentator, saying that, “This film has a message. This message is that Russia is 
ready to defend her interests with the help of the military, including the nuclear weaponry.” 
Some of demonizing of the West and Ukraine was also evident with comments such as, 
“Everybody in the world understood the movie. It showed perfectly well the situation in 
Eastern Ukraine and insignificant nature of the U.S. /…/“ or “People who support the 
ideology of Bandera cannot be adequate and shouldn’t be heard in international 
community!” Other supporters of the position taken by the documentary are expressing a 
great amount of pride about the actions of Russia with comments like, “I am watching the 
film and I am really impressed. My heart is beating hard from all the pride!” “The most 
important part of the movie is that all the steps taken were done according to the situation 
and thinking one step ahead. Well done! Vivat Russia!” and “I am gasping for some air! 
That was impressive! I am proud of Russia!” 
An interesting article published in a popular daily news portal gazeta.ru focused on a very 
particular statement made by president Putin in the documentary about the possible use of 
nuclear weaponry in Crimea. Narrowing down the essence of the documentary in the article 
(Путин: при неблагоприятном развитии событий в Крыму мы могли привести в 
готовность ядерные силы 2015) brought about a very interesting twist in the comments 
of the audience. Despite the number of reactions being relatively low, 20 in total, 13 of 
them took oppositional and only 7 dominant-hegemonic position in the decoding of the 
leading media discourse. Oppositional decoding is supported by multiple comments such 
as, “Being ready to use the nuclear weaponry all the time is extremely irresponsible! This 
stance is either pointless or completely insane!” “Does someone really think that annexing 
Crimea is worth a nuclear war? Oh wow!” “I am sorry that Ukraine does not longer 
possess the nuclear weapon. There wouldn’t have been any annexation of Crimea!” or 
“This person is insane. Killing our kids for a piece of land? Oh God, help us!” 
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Those taking the dominant-hegemonic position of decoding are logically most often 
referring to the narrative ‘Defining rivalry with the West’ commenting, “Stop panicking 
people, they knew what they are doing! This quote was clearly for president Obama!” or 
“Nuclear weapons should always be fully ready to use. Americans will be nuked and our 
defense systems will protect Moscow and Kremlin very well. Not many will survive, but oh 
imagine a world without Americans! That world will rock!” Despite seemingly focusing on 
the content of the documentary, taking out a specific quote had a very interesting effect on 
the reactions of the audience. 
The amount of reactions to the documentary was even more significant in the blogosphere. 
A blog platform of the liberal Фонтанка (Fontanka) internet based news portal actively 
reacted on the release of the documentary, creating a blog post named Путин. Крым на 
Родину (2015). Out of a stunning 1225 comments given to the post, 57 were deleted, 35 
comments took a clearly dominant-hegemonic position of decoding and 57 took an 
oppositional position of decoding. The relatively small amount of clear positions is caused 
by the fact that the discussion took off in very different directions and often the same 
people were commenting again and again. Their position was counted once though and 
generally only references to the film itself were taken into account. 
Still, in this blog, the oppositional interpretation prevailed. Many people pointed out that 
the documentary had propagandistic features that simply should not be ignored, supporting 
it with comments like, “Is there even any point discussing this obviously propagandistic 
film?” “It is actually quite interesting that even in a year’s time, propaganda still did not 
manage to explain why the Russian military presence in Crimea was necessary,” or “Well, 
the film is made kind of badly. It’s a completely dull propaganda. Even Poklonskaya did not 
save it, although the moment with the nuclear weapons was impressive!” Some viewers 
were rather shocked by some of the revelations made in the documentary, commenting, 
“The fact that Putin mobilized the nuclear weaponry is ridiculous. This basically means 
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that he put all the world in danger not even protecting his own territory?” “I hope that all 
of these confessions made in film are going to be considered by the International Court of 
Justice in Hague, where there eventually will be a process over a war criminal Putin /…/“ 
or “Our country will be ashamed for Putin’s delirium one day!” 
However, there were also those, who sympathized with the messages in the documentary. 
Some just agreed with Russian actions in Crimea, stating that, “We did everything correctly. 
We did what we needed to do. I am proud of my country, my military and my president.” 
Similarly to the reactions in other sources, the narrative ‘Defining rivalry with the West’ 
was once again well embraced by the public with comments such as, “The West, mad from 
the impunity and the lawless U.S. should have been punished by Russia. Keeping the 
dialogue alive with the West was the only mistake of Putin!” or “I see nothing bad in 
ruining our relationship with the United States. We should keep away from that kind of 
‘friends’ /…/.“ Such emotion-rich narratives as ‘Presenting the Russian way as diplomatic 
and non-military,’ ‘Crimea always being an unquestionable part of Russia’ and 
‘Demonizing Ukrainian authorities’ were also detected with the respective comments like, 
“In 2014, Crimea was reunited with almost no gunshots. All of the discussions about Putin 
will be forgotten in 10-15 years, but the fact that Crimea was peacefully reunited with 
Russia will be here forever,” “Let’s be honest in here, Crimea is a Russian territory. The 
fact that it is back in Russia is a historical moment that is underestimated at this point!” 
and “Please do not forget that Crimean people are way more moral than the murderous 
Ukrainian nationalists!” 
Last, but no least, the analysis of the Dean of the Higher School of Television at Moscow’s 
Lomonosov State University, journalist and political scientist, Vitaly Tretyakov’s blog in 
the LiveJournal platform was carried out. His post По реакции на фильм Андрея 
Кондрашова «Крым. Путь на Родину» мы сейчас увидим, кто есть ху… (2015) 
suggests to the audience to differentiate the reactions on the documentary, building an 
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understanding of ‘who is who’ based on these reactions. Just like in the case of the previous 
blog, not many people actually commented on the documentary itself. Out of 575 
comments, 46 dominant-hegemonic positions of the decoding were taken with only 4 
oppositional positions and 40 suspended or deleted comments respectively. 
The members of the audience taking the oppositional position at the stage of decoding were 
outnumbered significantly by the people supporting the rhetorics of the leading media 
discourse. Among some of the comments were reactions like, “The contrast of the film with 
the events in Eastern Ukraine is horrific. So, Crimea is ours, but Eastern Ukraine should be 
destroyed? Do our leaders see dreams about the bloodshed in there?” “The movie is simply 
revolting. Strategically everything is correct, but how about the real costs of it? This 
banality is killing me!” or “This is just a confession of the occupation!” 
A great amount of supporters of the leading media discourse did exactly what the owner of 
the blog asked them to, which is determine ‘who is who’ according to the reactions on the 
documentary. The narrative ‘Defining rivalry with the West’ was absolutely predominant, 
used in the comments such as, “I watched the movie and I am proud of our president. 
Political drones such as Obama and Psaki are a complete disgrace of the modern politics 
built in the U.S. and Europe,” “/…/ The United States has become an axis of evil 
themselves, because they have no future in a healthy world politics. Their export of war 
brings down the countries of the Third World one after another, without them countries 
realizing that it has been done by the U.S. /…/“ “The U.S. should be destroyed! The 
documentary only proves them being an aggressor and they should be punished!” or “Look, 
Americans have never been punished for their deeds, never dragged to the International 
Court of Justice, although they should have.” Next to these overly emotional addresses, 
commentators were also eager to stress their support for the actions of Russia, like with a 
comment, “I liked the message of the film. For all the foreigners it states that Crimea is 
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Russian. It is not negotiable, it is not a matter of discussion, and it will remain this way! It 
was really convincing.” 
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7. Analytical Conclusions 
The following chapter will be divided into two parts, representing the findings concerning 
the two main focuses of this thesis, narratives and emotions in Crimean annexation by the 
Russian Federation. 
 7.1. Narratives of the annexation 
Encoding analysis of the leading political discourse and the leading media discourse 
revealed their significant similarity. Among the narratives detected, six (Crimea always 
being  an unquestionable part of Russia, Demonizing Ukrainian authorities, Defining 
rivalry with the West, The right of self-determination of Crimean people, Presenting the 
Russian way as  diplomatic and non-military and Struggle over Russian status in global 
affairs) were used absolutely identically in both the political and media discourse. 
According to Fairclough (1995: 45) the state is extremely interesting in controlling media 
outputs and therefore it is no surprise that the discourses appear almost identical. One slight 
difference could of course be detected in the use of the narrative ‘Annexation is legitimized 
by the Russian public’ since the media discourse also visible included a strong will of 
Crimean Tatars and other nationalities to join the Russian Federation. However, the general 
trend of what Sturken & Catwright (2009: 21) describe as visual culture having a strong 
essence of ideology and power relations is evident. 
However, there were also slight differences in the narrative map. The narrative ‘Nostalgia 
over Soviet times’ was used actively in the political encoding, but had almost no relevance 
in the media discourse. It might be due to the fact that the Soviet imperial past was not 
necessary to stress after the war has broken down in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea was cut 
off Ukraine. Visual representation of Soviet nostalgia would have had a much stronger and 
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recognizable propagandistic nature, which could have been avoided on purpose. Contrary, 
narrative ‘Legality of the Russian actions in Crimea’ was much more strongly supported by 
the media discourse and was not as strongly portrayed in the speech. After a year of 
accusations passed, much more legitimization was needed for Russia’s actions. It would 
have been hard to justify cutting off a part of another country in any legal vocabulary a year 
ago, when the shock was still powerful. Despite these small differences, it could be 
concluded that the political discourse is almost mirrored by the media discourse, allowing 
to talk about a certain level of political propaganda in the media and start a bigger 
discussion on the freedom of media in Russia. 
Comparative results of the two discourses and their narratives of the Crimean annexation 
reveal extremely similar findings to those made by the several scholars. Urnov (2014: 305) 
and Forsberg, Heller & Wolf (2014: 261) have pointed out Russia’s struggle over its status 
which was also portrayed in the annexation narration. Prozorov’s (2007: 310) remarks on 
victimization, Nikolayenko’s (2008: 256) and Holak, Matveev &  Havlena’s (2007: 650) 
comments of Soviet nostalgia and Sharafutdinova’s (2014: 2) findings on Crimean special 
status were all obvious and present in the existing discourses and overall narrations. It is 
therefore a bigger identity building process which incorporated Crimean annexation 
discourse quite successfully in the leading ‘Russian way.’ 
One of the conclusions of the thesis is that media discourse has a much bigger ability to 
address the narratives in a very broad manner, using much more tools to convince the 
audiences in the correctness of their messages. Narratives used in the media discourse were 
much more coinciding and interdependent with each other, making narration more smooth 
and allowing to use much more visual techniques. Similar has been pointed out by Louw 
(2005: 202), who believes that media is the one who widely popularizes and naturalizes 
appropriate ideas. The narratives were also presented much more strongly in the media, 
showing many different facets of them. In this light, it is not a coincidence that the power of 
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image is used actively by the political authorities in Russia. Visual representations have 
become tools of building and consolidating the political agenda, policy and even the whole 
identity of the state. 
On the stage of decoding, both discourses can be considered successful in their attempts to 
address the certain messages to the public. The use of speeches and visual highlighted by 
several academics such as Fairclough (2006: 34), Dedaic (2006: 700), Luff (2010: 5) proves 
Russian political messaging to be successfully interpreted by the public just the way 
authorities find it necessary. If one does not count the reactions in the blogosphere, that 
were polarity different in both discourses, political discourse was decoded in the 
dominant-hegemonic way in about 85% of the cases and media discourse in about 77% of 
the cases. Interestingly, only a couple of people interpreted the messages in negotiated 
manner, leaving the picture relatively black and white.  
The blogosphere can be considered a very interesting deviation from the general trend of 
decoding the messages of both media and political discourse. Firstly, blogs generally have a 
much greater amount of responses, but these responses stand out by being less relevant. The 
discussion is much more likely to take off in a completely different direction or come down 
to short responses or personal messages and addresses. Out of the relevant comments, 
mostly an oppositional way of interpretation can be detected. 
The empirical case of the narration of the annexation of Crimea by Russia proves to be a 
good example of a political discourse’s dominant influence on the media output. The visual 
power of the media is used to a near full capacity by the Russian authorities, clearly 
forwarding messages to the public via all the possible resources, with the help of different 
visual and textual aids, and addressing the public as the audience, rather than active 
participants of the identity building. The wide use of history and memory appeals to 
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numerous members of the consuming mass is strengthened by powerful, yet sometimes 
horrific images deeply influencing people’s perception. 
According to the findings of the research, the role of Crimea in Russian discourse can be 
considered to be somewhat similar to a shift. It is a point, where numerous identity building 
processes coincided, leaving the whole narration almost complete. In a situation where 
images and words worked on the people’s mindset very well, the seemingly irrational shift 
was completely approved by the Russians. This battle was won, but how about the war of 
the identity building? Considering the steps after Russian annexation took place. the battle 
proved costly to the international community. The sense that everything works, that Crimea 
was added to Russia so easily, allowed Russian authorities to continue their actions in 
Eastern Ukraine. A larger question of whether that kind of annexations and their 
explanations should be believed and forgotten definitely arises and should not be ignored 
by the world politicians.  
Of course, the larger discussion for further consideration might also include a certain level 
of relativity of the used sources by the thesis. Should larger conclusions be made about 
Russian identity building or political and media discourse interaction? A certain level of 
bipartisanship is simply inevitable when it comes to studying one or another source of 
people’s reactions, especially with such a small research focus. Some news articles are 
already decoding the news in their own way, possibly influencing the comments. Personas 
and political views of the bloggers can also to some extent influential to someone who 
happens to read the blog and so on. For that manner, the following thesis tried to find a 
balance between the types of the analyzed resources. 
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 7.2. Emotions of the annexation 
Adding emotions to the analysis of narratives and general perception of the discourses on 
both encoding and decoding stage proved to be very fruitful, allowing to make interesting 
conclusions about the cases. Firstly, it is important to note that emotions, especially strong 
moral ones that were highlighted by Jasper (2006: 17), were very actively used at all of the 
stages of the Hall’s scheme. Strong moral negative emotions, such as anger, exclusion, 
injustice, and trauma were actively encoded and then decoded by the public. As pointed out 
by Ost (2004: 230), Thompson (2006: 123), Humphrey (2001: 332) and Henderson (2008: 
29) emotions can play a tremendously important role in getting your political messages 
through, which was also visible in case of Russian discourse towards Crimean annexation. 
Interestingly, the same tendency was even more evident when it came to the use of strong 
positive moral emotions at the stages of encoding and decoding. In the case of narrating 
the Crimean annexation, Russian authorities heavily used patriotism and positive emotions, 
which resulted to a similar reaction of the audience. What was meant to represent pride, 
justice, and patriotism was encoded in the same manner and then unpacked by the audience. 
In this light, it strongly resembles a loop of the use of memory and reliving it by the 
audiences described by Keightley (2008: 176). In a sense, the choices of the emotions 
encoded were not incidental, but were meant to reinforce and promote the narration and 
specific messages of the Russian authorities.  
Naturally, some messages had way more emotional elements injected into them than the 
others, also having a greater amount of feedback from the audiences. One does not have to 
be an expert to realize that narratives such as ‘Demonizing Ukrainian authorities,’ ‘Defining 
rivalry with the West’ and ‘Struggle over Russian status in global affairs’ were more 
thoroughly injected with negative moral emotions, and not surprisingly were interpreted 
exactly the same way by the public. The same applies when it comes to strong positive 
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emotions and narratives of ‘Crimea always being an unquestionable part of Russia’ and 
‘The right of self-determination of Crimean people.’ These narratives empowered by the 
emotionality can have a way greater effect on the public than visible at first sight. This 
combination can constitute the basis of the whole state identity and define the essence of 
the discourses. 
The use of emotions by Russian political discourse and integration of the same emotions in 
the leading media discourse allows to make several conclusions about the use of emotions 
in the Crimean annexation narration. Firstly, the Russian audience is addressed very 
emotionally and not without a reason. Because of the fact that the reactions were as 
emotional as the messages, one can say that Russian society in general is receptive to 
emotional addresses. Also, similarly to what was pointed out by Solomon (2014: 729), 
emotional addresses allow to strengthen messages and explain them to people easily, almost 
black or white. It seems that Russian society is eager to decode messages one way or 
another, without many negotiated positions taken. Knowing and using that, Russian 
authorities managed to turn something seemingly completely irrational into a matter of 
national pride and a must. It almost seems that the emotions sold annexation to the Russian 
people. 
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8. Summary 
This thesis focused on the question of how is the annexation of Crimea by Russian 
Federation is narrated in the leading political discourse and media discourse. This was done 
by analyzing two main cases representing discourses, a political speech of president Putin 
and a documentary film by Andrey Kondrashov, through the encoding/decoding model of 
Stuart Hall. In order to observe the decoding process, the paper focused on the reactions of 
the Russian public in blogs, social media and news article comments. In addition to 
highlighting the main narratives used to explain the annexation, the thesis also focused on 
analyzing the use of emotions at the stages of encoding and decoding. 
In order to answer the research questions, the following paper first highlighted the use of 
cultural studies as a method in conducting research in political science, mainly focusing on 
the encoding/decoding model of British Cultural Studies’ most prominent scholar Stuart 
Hall. In order to unravel Hall’s approach, importance and power of an image, and an 
essence of the political discourse was introduced. In order to strengthen the model of 
encoding/decoding and understand the matter of message interpretation, the use of 
emotions in politics was also highlighted in the theoretical part. The chapter highlighting 
the case study of Russian policy towards Crimea also introduced the key focus of the thesis. 
The analysis of the narration of Crimean annexation by the Russian Federation according to 
the model of Stuart Hall was carried out in chapters five and six. Based on the results of the 
analysis it can be concluded that the main narratives encoded by both discourses coincided 
almost completely, with minor changes in interpretation. The following list of narratives 
can be detected in both discourses: 
1. Crimea always being an unquestionable part of Russia; 
2. Demonizing Ukrainian authorities; 
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3. Defining rivalry with the West; 
4. The right of self-determination of Crimean people; 
5. Presenting the Russian way as diplomatic and non-military; 
6. Struggle over Russian status in global affairs; 
7. Annexation is legitimized by the Russian public (and demanded by all of the Crimean 
nations). 
These narratives were almost identically encoded by the discourses and then decoded by 
the people. The results of observing discourse decoding in blogs, social media and news 
articles revealed that preferable position of decoding was dominant-hegemonic, with 85% 
and 77% of the cases respectively. It identifies a relative success by the Russian authorities 
in offering their version of the Crimean annexation by Russia. 
The second main focus of the thesis, which was the use of emotions by both discourses 
revealed interesting findings about emotion encoding/decoding. Mainly strong moral 
emotions were encoded in the narration of the annexation and they were also mirrored by 
the audience, strengthening and empowering the position of the discourses and increasing 
the success of delivering narratives in a preferable way. As one of the interesting findings of 
the paper, strong positive moral emotions, such as pride, prevailed over negative ones, such 
as anger. Nevertheless, emotions played a crucial role in addressing this specific audience, 
being Russian society, and delivering the Russian authorities version of the Crimean 
annexation. 
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Kokkuvõte 
Narratiivide ja emotsioonide kasutamine Venemaa poolt Krimmi annekteerimise diskursus-
es 
Käesoleva magistritöö eesmärk oli uurida missuguseid narratiive ja emotsioone on 
Venemaa võimud kasutanud Krimmi annekteerimise põhjendamisel. Selleks vaadeldi 
lähemalt Krimmi annekteerimise põhjendamist juhtivas poliitilises ning juhtivas meedia 
diskursuses, et jõuda parema arusaamiseni konkreetsete narratiivide ning emotsioonide 
kasutamisest  annekteerimise põhjendamisel. 
Magistritöö teoreetiline raamistik põhineb Briti kultuuriuuringute koolkonnal, sest töö 
fookuses olevad narratiivide konstrueerimine ja emotsioonide kasutamine jäävad välja 
traditsiooniliste poliitikateaduste uurimisobjektidest. Briti kultuuriuuringute koolkonna 
tähtsaima esindaja, Stuart Hall’i kodeerimise/dekodeerimise (ingl encoding/decoding) 
mudel võimaldas analüüsida narratiivide ning emotsioonide konstrueerimist vastavas 
diskursuses ning sisestatud sõnumite rahvapoolset tõlgendamist. Teoreetiline raamistik 
sisaldab ka poliitilise ning meedia diskursuse kirjeldusi ning emotsioonide kasutust 
poliitikas. Empiirilisele analüüsile eelnes ka Venemaa poolt Krimmi annekteerimise 
diskursuse tutvustus. Rakendades Stuart Hall’i mudelit, uuriti missuguseid narratiive ja 
emotsioone kasutati juhtivas Vene poliitilises diskursuses ning juhtivas Vene meedia 
diskursuses Krimmi annekteerimise põhjendamisel. 
Lähtudes teoreetilisest raamistikust püstitati antud magistritöös kolm uurimisküsimust. 
Lisaks narratiivide ja emotsioonide väljatoomisele uuriti kahe diskursuse omavahelist 
kattuvust ning emotsioonitüüpide efektiivsust poliitilise sõnumi edastamisel.  
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Empiirilise uurimuse läbiviimiseks kodeerimise/dekodeerimise mudeli järgi võeti aluseks 
kaks peamist näidet. Poliitilist diskursust analüüsiti läbi Vladimir Putini 2014. aasta 
Krimmi kõne ning meedia diskursust läbi telekanali Россия 1 Andrey Kondrašovi 
dokumentaalfilmi “Krimm. Tee koju.”. Mõlema diskursuse puhul uuriti narratiivide ja 
emotsioonide kodeerimist ning seejärel dekodeerimist. Narratiivide ja emotsioonide 
dekodeerimist uuriti inimeste tagasiside kaudu sotsiaalmeedias ja meediaväljaannete 
kommentaariumites ning   läbi kommentaaride blogides. 
Toetudes analüüsi tulemustele, võib väita, et mõlemad diskursused on olemuselt sarnased, 
sest nendes sisalduvad kodeeritud narratiivid ja emotsioonid on peaaegu kattuvad. Enim 
kodeeritud ja dekodeeritud narratiividest võib välja tuua järgmised: 
1. Krimm on alati olnud vaieldamatu Venemaa osa; 
2. Uute Ukraina võimude demoniseerimine; 
3. Rivaliteedi kinnitamine Lääneriikidega; 
4. Krimmi elanike enesemääramiseõigusele appelleerimine; 
5. Venemaa poliitika esitamine diplomaatilise ja rahumeelsena; 
6. Võitlus Venemaa rahvusvahelise staatuse üle; 
7. Krimmi annekteerimise legitimiseerimine Venemaa kodanike poolt. 
Analüüsi tulemusel selgus, et just nende narratiividega põhjendati kõige enam Krimmi 
annekteerimise vajadust. Samade narratiividega tõlgendas rahvas Krimmi sündmuseid 
valitseva võimu tahte kohaselt ehk Vene võimude domineerivalt positisioonilt. Vaid 
vähesed uuritud  reaktsioonid erinesid võimulolijate omadest. Seega võib rääkida 
diskursuste kattuvusest ning Vene võimude poliitiliste sõnumite edastamise edust. 
Lisaks konkreetsetele diskursustes kasutatavatele narratiividele on vene võimud olnud 
aktiivsed ja edukad emotsioonide kasutamisel Krimmi annekteerimise põhjendamisel. Nii 
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Putini kõnesse kui ka Kondrašovi dokumentaalfilmi on osavalt kodeeritud uhkus, viha, 
ebaõiglustunne ja teised tugevad moraalsed emotsioonid. Vastavad tunded on esindatud ka 
rahva reaktsioonides. Mõned narratiivid paistsid eriti silma tugeva emotsionaalse 
komponendi poolest, mistõttu on just need narratiivid kajastunud rahva reaktsioonides 
kõige enam. Seega on Vene võimud olnud edukad emotsioonide kasutajad poliitiliste 
sõnumite edastamisel, tekitades publikus tugevat vastukaja ning reaktsiooni seoses Krimmi 
annekteerimisega. 
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